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Abstract 
 
We provide an analysis of the use of Creative Commons (CC) licenses, an approach to licens-
ing creative works which has become very popular among authors who wish to promote more 
liberal sharing and use of their work. We provide data demonstrating the popularity of CC, ex-
amine which specific license types within the CC framework are most popular, and then iden-
tify contributing factors for the relative popularity of some of the license types. This includes in-
dividual author incentives, the consistency and aims of the online communities which adopt CC 
as a licensing model, the underlying medium (text, photography, audio, video or interactive 
content), the intended use of the work, as well as the sociopolitical, legal and economic back-
ground of the jurisdictions where the works are being produced. We show that the spread of 
the licenses is global and encompasses both developed and developing nations with varied 
cultural and historical backgrounds, which we claim is indicative of a general social shift to-
wards more open collaboration and the rise of a new global consciousness of sharing and par-
ticipation across national borders. By examining the relationship between piracy rates and li-
cense adoption we find only weak support for the common assumption that a relatively lax or 
critical view on the part of the population towards intellectual property law is providing fertile 
ground for licenses like CC which offer a more liberal legal alternative. Only an analysis of the 
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complex legal, economic and geopolitical background of each jurisdiction seems to yield plau-
sible explanations for the observed differences in licensing across jurisdictions. In conclusion 
we examine to what extent copyright law and policy should be informed by the needs and 
choices of this new generation of authors adopting CC licenses, also taking into consideration 
the changing interests of society in the digital age.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
With the development of the Internet and particularly with the newest breed of collaboration and 
communication technologies commonly labeled as Web 2.0, we have been witnessing the rapid 
growth of ‘participatory media’, whereby both professional and amateur authors create and share 
digital content with greater ease than ever before. This has led to the development of hugely 
popular online content production and sharing communities such as Flickr, Youtube and Wikipe-
dia. Besides these oft-quoted examples there exists a large number of less publicized, ‘long-tail’ 
communities and content repositories (e.g., the Internet Archive, Revver, ccMixter, OpenSound, 
deviantArt, blip.tv) as well as several similar communities with a local geographical focus (e.g., 
Sony’s eyeVio for Japan). Some music labels with novel business models have also started mak-
ing all their content freely available online for streaming and/or download (e.g., Magnatune, Ja-
mendo). If we add to this all the content users post on blogs hosted either on popular sites (e.g., 
Blogger, Wordpress, Typepad) or on individually hosted blogs, and the content posted by users 
on social networking sites such as Myspace, Orkut, Friendster or Facebook, it becomes clear that 
we have embarked on an irreversible trend towards more open sharing of digital content in very 
large numbers. 
 
Although the total size of the pool of content made available online is hard to estimate, it is safe to 
assume that it is in the order of at least hundreds of millions, if not in the order of billions of digital 
files. Apart from the cases where copyrighted content is published by third parties on sites such 
as YouTube, a large share of user-submitted content (e.g., in Flickr, Wikipedia and the Internet 
Archive) is created by the people who post it. Like all creative works, this content is automatically 
protected by Copyright Law in all countries that have signed the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Artistic and Literary Works of 1886 (which includes almost all nations in the world). Under 
this regime all rights associated with the content are automatically and exclusively reserved for 
the respective authors.  
 
However, sharing, participation and collaborative production have led to a shift in the mindset of 
some authors who choose to waive1 some of the exclusive rights granted to them automatically 
by Copyright Law. Even if this trend towards more liberal licensing of digital content has been 
preceded by the successful employment of Free Software and Open Source licenses, for digital 
media (text, audio, pictures, video and interactive content) it is witnessed most clearly in the 
popularity of Creative Commons (CC) licenses.2 Some of the content on several of the websites 
we have already mentioned and on individual user websites/blogs is licensed today under CC. 
We will show that the size of the CC-licensed content pool is significant and therefore the use of 
CC licenses warrants our attention as an object of study and as an indicator of the preferences of 
the large number of authors who choose to license their creative output under more liberal terms. 
 
                                                 
1 This waiving of exclusive rights need not be permanent. It can be revoked by the author at a later point in 
time, although the new set of restrictions cannot be applied retroactively.  
2 For more information on CC visit the CC homepage: http://creativecommons.org and in particular the de-
scription of the licenses at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/. Lawrence Lessig’s book Free Culture, Pen-
guing Press, 2004, also available at http://www.free-culture.cc/ provides more background on the reasoning 
behind the introduction of CC and the importance of keeping cultural production free to share and build upon. 
The licenses were first introduced in December 2002. 
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Unlike the Free Software Foundation licenses which offer two licensing options (GPL and LGPL), 
CC offers more options in order to address the diverse needs and requirements of a population of 
authors which is much larger than that of software developers. There is also a difference in mind-
set: Free Software licenses are designed specifically with the aim of preserving and growing a 
pool of freely available software and thus force developers who build upon Free Software to also 
license their derivative software components under the same licenses (thus ensuring that these 
derivative works will also be ‘free’). CC on the other hand offers this restriction only as an option, 
called “share-alike”. Generally, the spirit of CC is to offer options rather than dictate a specific 
licensing approach3. This ‘design feature’ of CC adds to the value of studying the use of the li-
censes, as for the first time in history we can publicly observe very large numbers of people mak-
ing licensing decisions across a well-defined spectrum of options. Therefore, we argue that even 
if most of the creative output of society is not CC-licensed, the fact that CC is popular and CC 
user decisions can be observed and span a range of options makes the use of CC a prime sub-
ject of study for anyone interested in how authors value the rights that Copyright Law seeks to 
protect.  
 
We cannot know how many of the CC users are professionals versus amateurs, or represent for-
profit organizations versus non-profits. However, based on the types of online communities that 
have adopted CC so far it is fair to assume that a large share of CC-licensed content today is 
produced by amateurs, in the sense that the activity which has led to the production of the con-
tent is not the authors’ main source of income. This is not to say that this content does not have 
any social value nor any commercial potential, as it may be of high quality or generate great in-
terest, as evidenced by the popularity of some user-submitted text, music, photos and videos on 
sites which predominantly host amateur content (e.g., Flickr, Revver) and which are also not co-
incidentally among the first adopters of CC as a licensing model4. For most of these authors the 
Internet is their main publication and promotion medium, as opposed to professionals for whom 
the Internet is typically just one of several distribution and promotion channels. As the Internet 
and electronic commerce continuously grow in importance it is likely that more authors will use 
the Internet as their main distribution channel and this may lead to more professional authors us-
ing CC.  
The licenses 
The Creative Commons is a set of licenses which anyone can use when publishing content online 
by adding a hyperlink or an icon with a hyperlink to the page on the Creative Commons website 
hosting the license description. In response to various requests by a broad community of authors 
CC has introduced a number of license types to suit different needs. By far the most popular li-
censes are: 
 
• [BY] By Attribution: this is the most liberal license in the framework. All uses of the origi-
nal work are permitted, with the only constraint that in every use the original work must 
be attributed to the original author. The same constraint is present in all licenses below. 
• [BY-SA] By Attribution – Share Alike: same as BY, with the additional constraint that any 
derivative works will also have to be licensed under BY-SA.  
                                                 
3 Free Software licensing, also sometimes called ‘copyleft’ licensing, shares some of the same aims with 
Creative Commons, most importantly they both aim to build a ‘commons’ of information. The main difference 
is that copyleft supporters maintain an ‘ethical’/political stance which dictates that content and software 
should be free and everyone benefiting from this free pool should give back to it by licensing in the same 
manner. For a critical view on the political motivations behind copyleft and a comparison to CC see Info-
communism? A Critique of the Emerging Discourse on Property Rights in Information, by Martin Mueller, 
available at: http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/403/Info-Communism-Mueller.pdf 
4 Creative Commons licenses can be applied to any creative work that is not bound by other licensing and/or 
contractual obligations, irrespective of the format and distribution medium. Our data is limited to content 
posted on the Internet, though this is not limiting the scope of our analysis in any way as the Internet has 
been the main distribution channel for CC-licensed works.  
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• [BY-ND] By Attribution – No Derivatives: same as BY, but not permitting the creation of 
derivative works. Note that ND and SA are mutually exclusive 
• [BY-NC] By Attribution – Non-Commercial: same as BY, but not permitting commercial 
use.  
• [BY-NC-SA] By Attribution – Non-commercial – Share Alike: same as BY-SA, but not 
permitting commercial use. 
• [BY-NC-ND] By Attribution – Non-Commercial – No Derivatives: same as BY-ND, but not 
permitting commercial use. This is the most restrictive license in the framework and its 
only difference to full copyright protection is that (like all CC licenses) it allows for non-
commercial copying and distribution of the work (i.e. it allows for legal ‘file-sharing’ of the 
content) 
 
Creative Commons licenses must be understood in the context of the existing copyright regime. 
Copyright law emerged from the advent of the printing press (an early form of copying) in the U.K. 
in the 17th Century. It was not until the 19th Century that the first international treaty was estab-
lished in the form of the Berne Convention, when the recognition of a common copyright among 
signatory states was established. Since then most, if not all domestic copyright laws around the 
world as well as a series of international treaties proliferated thereby establishing a worldwide 
copyright regime. National copyright laws are substantially similar, partly due to transposition of 
laws and the harmonizing nature of treaties, particularly their scope of protection and the nature 
of copyright.5  
 
Generally, copyrights for creative works do not have to be registered, asserted or even declared, 
and owners automatically enjoy copyright protection as soon as an original work is expressed in 
tangible form (such as written or recorded onto a medium). Copyright protection is thus automatic 
or reserved by default, unless specifically ‘opted-out’ of by the owner of the creation (which may 
not be the original author). Notably, the international regime currently includes  treaties produced 
by the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright (WIPO) such as the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty of 1996 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996 as well as the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), an international 
treaty setting down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property, which is adminis-
tered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and that forms part of its package of agreements 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
 
Since the advent of the digital age and the changes in the context in which it operates, there have 
been varying levels of legal and policy responses to the challenges that are posed to the copy-
right regime. Figure 1 provides an overview of all the types of measures in place for the protection 
(i.e. restrictions on the use) of creative works and the ways in which some rights can be waived, 
by exemptions in the law itself and by authors voluntarily waiving these rights, with or without 
supportive policy measures. 
                                                 
5 On why default IP law is slanted towards over-protection and the industry interests, see e.g., Lastowka at 
49-51 (explaining the lack of legal responses to “open copyright” and how public choice theory explains the 
way regulations will tend toward “industry capture” and away from public interest); Christina Bohannan, Re-
claiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 567, 568 (2006) (As a result of “special-interest capture”, the 
U.S. Copyright Act confers overly broad rights to copyright holders at the expense of public interest in ac-
cess and dissemination); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 375-76 (2005) (describing the CC movement as 
a response to the problems caused by industry capture of copyright); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionaliza-
tion of Technology Law, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 529, 531-32 (2000) (arguing that the problems predicted by 
public choice theory are particularly acute in the context of IP law). On the overextension of copyright laws 
and the increasing protractionism and protectionism, see generally, Irene Segal Ayers, The Future of Global 
Copyright Protection: Has Copyright Law Gone Too Far?, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 49 (2000). 
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Objective and organization of paper 
In this paper we utilize the findings of the CC-Monitor project at Singapore Management Univer-
sity, which has produced perhaps the most comprehensive dataset to date6 on the global popu-
larity and use of CC licenses, to analyze the factors influencing licensing decisions, the lessons 
that can be learnt from CC adoption patterns, and the signals that they provide on how a new 
generation of authors view creative works and intellectual property.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Regime of control of creative works 
 
 
We first establish that even if the majority of the content published today is still governed by the 
basic provisions of Copyright Law, and this is unlikely to change in the near-term due to the 
automatic application of the law on the birth of a work, the use of CC licenses has reached the 
kind of critical mass and global appeal that warrant treating this use as an indicator of a new trend 
in intellectual property. We will then examine factors which could account for the global and local 
popularity of these licenses in different jurisdictions, as well as factors which could be influencing 
the relative popularity of the various license types within the CC framework, as the framework 
provides several options to authors, from more liberal to more restrictive.  
 
We will also discuss whether current policy and Copyright law are aligned with the needs and 
desires of this new generation of authors who embrace CC as a licensing model. We will con-
                                                 
6 Some data points on CC license growth and overall license mix have been published on the CC Wiki by 
Mike Linksvayer: http://wiki.creativecommons.org/License_statistics. Also, a tool is available on the open-
business website where the user can select a jurisdiction and the license mix for that jurisdiction is displayed 
in a pie chart: http://www.openbusiness.cc/cc_stat/. Recently some of our early findings were published to-
gether with data collected by Mike Linksvayer on CC growth on the CC homepage: 
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/7551. Some authors have embarked on jurisdiction-specific data 
collection efforts, for example see Finding and Quantifying Australia’s Online Commons, by Ben Bildstein, 
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol4-1/bildstein.asp. 
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clude by suggesting potential corrective measures which will take into consideration and promote 
the interests of this new global community of authors who value open sharing and participation 
while still accommodating for authors who will continue to prefer the full protection granted by 
current practice. In this sense, our proposals should contribute towards an increase in total social 
welfare.  
 
We recognize that at this stage we cannot yet make any definitive claims as to what would be a 
socially optimal approach towards balancing the benefits of sharing and collaboration based on 
liberal licensing and the concerns of copyright holders who favor the more restrictive terms of 
Copyright Law. Nevertheless, we do aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the role of 
copyright in the information age by bringing to light the choices made by a growing population of 
authors and copyright holders who voluntarily waive some of their legal rights. Many commenta-
tors write mainly from the public policy and enforcement perspective. In our paper, we seek to 
analyze the issues from the social and people’s perspective through looking at their behavior by 
interpreting CC data. 
The size of CC 
In earlier work7 we measured the adoption of CC licenses and the relative popularity of each li-
cense type using 3 methods (backlink search, CC-search and dictionary search) and 2 search 
engines, Yahoo and Google. We also collected limited CC usage data from online communities, 
including Flickr, which is known to host many photographs licensed under CC. Our results using 
Yahoo and Google search placed the total size of the CC-licensed content pool within a wide 
range of about 1 (based on a Google backlink search) to 37 million (based on a Yahoo backlink 
search) items. These are estimates of the search engines and depend on the engines’ ability to 
index CC pages correctly and on the engine’s search algorithms. Moreover, not only do these 
estimates vary greatly in size, but an unknown quantity of CC-licensed content will not even ap-
pear in these estimates as both Yahoo and Google do not index the entire Internet. However, by 
combining several data sources we have been able to come to a total estimate of the size of the 
CC-licensed content pool. 
 
Flickr data is particularly useful as it is an actual count of the CC-licensed photos hosted by Flickr 
(i.e., it is not an estimate), and we can therefore assume that it is precise. On the day of our 
measurement Flickr was hosting about 36 million CC-licensed photos. This immediately casts 
doubts on the Google estimate of little over 1 million items. Interestingly however, the relative 
popularity of each license type within the CC framework was the same (with little variation) for 
both Yahoo and Google results with all the methods we employed, but Flickr exhibited a some-
what different picture on this relative popularity. Knowing that even the Yahoo estimate of almost 
37 million items did not include all CC-licensed content, we used the Flickr count as a basis from 
which to estimate the total size of the CC pool. We did this by computing the minimum number of 
CC-licensed items which must exist outside Flickr for the license mix (i.e. the relative popularity of 
each CC license type) observed in Flickr to be consistent with the license mix observed with Ya-
hoo search. This led to a conservative estimate of 60 million for the total size of CC content on 
the Internet. Based on this estimate we can state that even if most of the content on the Internet 
today is not CC-licensed, the appeal of CC licenses is significant and it is fair to say that CC is 
currently the de facto alternative for any author wishing to license his/her output under more lib-
eral terms8. 
                                                 
7 Our measurement methodology is documented in detail in Measuring the Commons, by Cheliotis, Guglani 
and Tayi, presented at the 3rd Symposium on Statistical Challenges in E-Commerce Research, at the Uni-
versity of Connecticut, May 2007. This paper is currently being revised for journal submission. The same 
material was presented at the 2007 iCommons Summit in Dubrovnik, Croatia, and the presentation slides 
are available at http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/7551.  
8 CC licenses are not suitable for software, and CC proponents usually recommend the use of FSF licenses 
(GPL,LGPL) instead. Similarly, the FSF is recommending CC licenses (specifically BY and BY-SA) for art, 
entertainment and education works: http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/. 
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Factors affecting licensing behavior 
As already noted, with Creative Commons we can observe for the first time large numbers of us-
ers making licensing decisions. Given the relatively recent introduction of such licenses there is 
no established body of literature describing the process of making such decisions and the trade-
offs involved (we can contrast this to the field of consumer choice which has matured over time 
and has developed theoretical and observable mathematical constructs describing product 
choice). As a starting point it is reasonable to assume that, like all other aspects of human behav-
ior, licensing choice is affected by both endogenous and exogenous factors, that is to say both 
the author’s individual incentives and the environment must play a role in the decision.  
 
Given our earlier discussion of the differences underlying copyleft/FSF and CC licenses, it is clear 
that some of the license users are not driven by purely utilitarian objectives, but rather by an ideo-
logical conviction that information should be free and open sharing should be the norm, not the 
exception. We can therefore assume that the average user of such licensing approaches will be 
driven partly by personal utilitarian objectives and partly by personal conviction. Altruism may also 
play a role. Moreover, as these users typically function as members of online communities, the 
aims of the community and the beliefs of the other members of the same community likely influ-
ence the decisions of the individual. Finally, since the concepts of copyright and authors’ rights 
are not unique to the cyber-realm, it is also possible that the geopolitical, legal and economic 
background of a user’s offline community (i.e. of the country or jurisdiction the user belongs to) 
also play a role.  
 
Figure 2 depicts a nested model showing how the various factors may influence licensing deci-
sions, assuming that every author is a member of at least one online community and that each 
community is mainly concerned with one medium type.9 Specifically, it shows that individual au-
thor choices, which the author would make if isolated from the influence of other members, must 
be combined with influences from the community (or communities) that he/she is a member of, 
and with more macro-level influences from the author’s background. It is important to note that, 
like any model, this is a simplified depiction of reality. In practice some of the branches of the 
nested model may in fact influence each other. This becomes clear if we observe that the au-
thor’s expectation of the work’s reuse value (as well as the market value of the original work) de-
pends on the use that other members of a community will make of the work. So even at the level 
of individual author choice, exogenous factors do play a role. 
 
The nested model of Figure 2 contains some factors which are hard, if not impossible, to quantify, 
such as the historical reliance of a society on shared property. We therefore do not propose using 
this as a basis for quantitative analysis (although simplified versions could be valuable for that 
purpose), but rather as a map to guide us through the various factors which may be influencing 
the licensing patterns we observe in the collected data. In the rest of the paper we will use this as 
a reference model when discussing individual factors, starting from individual author incentives 
and trade-offs, then moving to the influence of the community, and finally to the influence of the 
environment. The reasons for including each factor in Figure 2 and the nature of the depicted re-
lationships will become clearer in the respective sections of the paper which deal with these fac-
tors. 
 
 
9 This assumption is consistent with observation, where most communities (unlike content repositories such 
as the Internet Archive) are built around one medium type (e.g., Flickr: photography, Youtube, blip.tv: video, 
ccmixter, Jamendo, Magnatune: audio). Social networking sites are different as users incorporate multiple 
media types in their profiles, but the aims of these communities are also different and are mostly driven by 
personal interaction rather than content sharing and production. In such communities the media placed on a 
user’s profile is usually not the main subject of interest; it is rather used to tell a story about the user’s own 
character and background. 
  
Figure 2: Nested model of license choice incorporating micro-level incentives and macro-level influencing factors 
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Individual author choice 
As we have already discussed, search engine results may have differed in estimates of the total 
size of the CC pool, but they provide a very consistent view on the relative popularity of each li-
cense type in the CC framework. Based on the structure inherent in the license definitions and 
the observed license mix we deconstruct the licensing decisions that any author will face and es-
timate the probability of each decision based on the search data we have collected. Specifically, a 
rational author who is not bound by prior licensing or contractual obligations and who has full 
knowledge of the meaning and implications of each CC license type will choose a license based 
on the following decisions: 
 
Table 1: Decisions 
Decision Description 
D1 Do you permit non-commercial copying and distribution of your work? 
D2 Do you permit commercial uses of your work?10
D3 Do you permit the creation of derivative works? 
D4 Do you want derivative works to be licensed in the same way as your wok? 
 
Based on a simple yes/no answer to each of these questions, an author is able to choose an ap-
propriate CC license (or stay with the full automatic protection of Copyright Law, if the answer to 
D1 is negative). Note that D2-D4 are only relevant if the answer to D1 is affirmative. Note also that 
if the answer to D2 is affirmative, then D3 refers to the creation of commercial and non-commercial 
derivative works, as both will be allowed in this case. When the answer to D2 is negative, D3 has 
a more limited scope: it refers only to non-commercial derivative works, as the creation of com-
mercial derivatives has already been excluded in D2. Let us first examine some of the potential 
motivations for an author to give an affirmative or negative answer to each of the questions and 
the trade-offs involved, and then we will present some estimates of the probabilities of occurrence 
for each decision.  
Non-commercial distribution 
An affirmative answer to D1 can be motivated by three factors:  
 
1. an intention to use the Internet as a free distribution channel to enhance one’s reputation 
2. an ideological conviction that (at least) non-commercial sharing is beneficial to society 
 
The trade-off for such a decision is that the author’s ability to sell copies of this work for profit will 
be diminished, because if the work is popular other users will be keen to distribute it non-
commercially, creating an abundance of freely available copies. However, the author will still be 
able to charge a fee when licensing the work for commercial uses. Commercial distribution of the 
work by third parties is not likely to be of interest as, with the same reasoning, if the work is popu-
lar, non-commercial distribution will dominate, at least in markets where distribution costs are 
very low (as is the case with Web/peer-to-peer distribution in markets with high broadband pene-
tration). It therefore follows that the main way in which the author may seek to profit from the work 
is by licensing the work for the creation of commercial derivative works. The only exception to this 
is where the work has significant value in markets with relatively high distribution costs. This is 
the case with books where most people today still prefer reading a hardcopy of a book and licens-
                                                 
10 There exist some issues relating to the definition and scope of ‘commercial’ versus ‘non-commercial’ use, 
as some uses may or may not be considered commercial in nature depending on the interpretation of the 
legal code of a license. We will not concern ourselves with these issues in this paper, as from a user stand-
point ‘non-commercial use’ will generally be interpreted as any use which does not generate revenue. Other 
definitions of ‘non-commercial’ are possible, but this does not influence our analysis. 
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ing the text under CC does not diminish the publisher’s profits, as the free distribution of the text 
in electronic form is not a very good substitute for the hardcopy version.  
Commercial use 
An affirmative answer to D2 is motivated by similar factors: 
 
1. an expectation that by allowing commercial use the incentive of third parties to promote the 
work will be higher, with potentially higher reputation gains 
2. an ideological conviction that sharing is beneficial to society, irrespective of whether it is done 
for profit 
3. altruistic motivations11 
 
By allowing commercial copying and distribution of the work the author essentially encourages 
third parties to distribute his/her work for profit and without a requirement for compensation. This 
is meaningful if the author desires to achieve maximum exposure for the work to maximize poten-
tial reputation gains, without seeking any immediate financial compensation (although reputation 
gains can translate to future indirect rewards), as the market for the work will become quickly 
saturated by a combination of commercial and non-commercial distribution by third parties. The 
decision to permit the creation of commercial derivates of the work is deferred to the next stage in 
the decision process, D3. 
Derivative works 
For decision D3 we need to distinguish between two cases, depending on the outcome of D2. An 
affirmative answer to D3 if the answer to D2 has been negative can be motivated by: 
 
1. an expectation of additional reputation gains through reference to the original work and attri-
bution to the original author in non-commercial derivative works (which may also be improv-
ing on or developing further the original work) 
2. an ideological conviction that non-commercial creative re-use is beneficial to society 
 
The creation of non-commercial derivative works does not exclude but can be detrimental to ex-
pectations of financial gains through licensing the work for commercial derivatives. This is be-
cause non-commercial derivatives may become (imperfect) substitutes for the commercial deriva-
tives and thus compete with them for the attention of consumers (we can imagine a scenario 
where a large number of non-commercial remixes of a song compete for attention with a com-
mercial remix). Also, through the act of non-commercial creative re-use of the original material 
other authors may be able to boost their reputation and it is possible that some of them will utilize 
this to compete in the marketplace with the original author. In this sense the original author may 
feel that by permitting derivative works, even if under the non-commercial restriction, he/she is 
essentially allowing potential competitors to ‘piggy-back’ on his/her creative output. Nevertheless, 
the author will preserve the right to license his/her work for use in commercial derivatives, so 
these detrimental effects may be of only marginal significance after all. 
 
An affirmative answer to D3 if the answer to D2 has also been affirmative can be motivated by: 
 
1. a desire to maximize reputation gains through reference to the original work and attribution to 
the original author in commercial and non-commercial derivative works12 
2. an ideological conviction that creative re-use is beneficial to society, irrespective of whether it 
is done for profit 
                                                 
11 Note that we only consider altruistic motivations in cases where both commercial and non-commercial 
uses are permitted by the author, because an author motivated by altruism would likely not make the com-
mercial/non-commercial distinction. 
12 Where commercial derivatives may be produced by professionals and thus improve upon the original work 
even more than non-commercial derivatives would have. 
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3. altruistic motivations 
 
The detrimental effects to commercial exploitation of the original work when allowing both com-
mercial and non-commercial derivatives to exist will be direct and significant. Gains from com-
mercial distribution have already been diminished by the author permitting commercial uses. By 
also allowing commercial derivatives the author foregoes commercial licensing opportunities 
(such as the licensing of a music piece to be used as a soundtrack for a movie). It follows that 
such an author must be motivated by the expectation of strong reputation gains, altruism, or ideo-
logical conviction, without the expectation of any immediate financial rewards.  
The share-alike constraint 
Behind the ‘share-alike’ constraint available in CC licenses lies a deeply rooted perception of fair-
ness which has its strongest proponent in the Free Software Movement, although the concept 
does enjoy broader appeal. The underlying justification for this constraint is that if an author 
chooses to license his/her work under more liberal terms, then it is only fair that whoever is using 
this work for their own purposes (thus benefiting from the liberal licensing) should also license 
his/her output under the exact same conditions (thus contributing back to the pool of liberally li-
censed content). This is likely the most important motivation behind the choice of such licenses 
by CC users, a sort of legal ‘tit for tat’ and an example of the moral philosophy popularly known 
as “paying it forward”. 
 
Let us examine additional motivations: If the answer to D2 has been negative, then an affirmative 
answer to D4 (i.e. the selection of by-nc-sa) may also be motivated by a mostly irrational but per-
haps somewhat justified fear of derivative authors licensing their output under terms which would 
allow third parties (or authors of second-generation derivative works) to commercially benefit from 
the original work. By forcing the self-perpetuating share-alike constraint original authors can en-
sure that all generations of derivatives based on their work will also be licensed under by-nc-sa 
and thus will not be commercially distributed. This fear is somewhat  irrational because licensing 
under by-nc would also exclude commercial exploitation of the derivative work, although the 
situation becomes less clear when it comes to second-generation derivatives, where the use of 
by-nc-sa can be interpreted as a ‘safety lock’ on the licensing of all future derivatives of the origi-
nal work. In the case where the answer to D2 has been affirmative the safety lock argument is 
also applicable. 
 
A well-known complication that share-alike introduces is potential incompatibilities which can hin-
der the creation of derivative works. Suppose for example that a derivative incorporates two 
works, one licensed under by-sa and the other under by-nc-sa. The constraints imposed by the 
two licenses are incompatible as one dictates that the derivative should be licensed under by-sa, 
whereas the other dictates that it should be licensed under by-nc-sa. If the two works had been 
licensed under by and by-nc instead, the derivative work could have been licensed under by-nc to 
satisfy the constraints on commercial exploitation imposed by the second work. By adding the 
share-alike constraint on both original works the derivative work is forced into a gray zone of il-
legality13. It follows that imposing the SA constraint will reduce the appeal of the original work as 
raw material for derivative works, which in some cases may defeat the purpose of allowing de-
rivatives in the first place. Nevertheless, besides this shortcoming, the SA constraint does not 
have any other direct negative effect on the author of the original work.  
Decision tree and probabilities of outcomes 
Based on the previous discussion and our definition of D1-D4 we can construct a decision tree to 
model author decisions. Then, based on the data we have collected on CC usage we can infer 
                                                 
13 The pros and cons of the share-alike constraint have been discussed extensively in CC-related mailing 
lists and the potential legal gridlock caused by conflicting share-alike constraints has been documented in 
more detail in Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 
IDEA 391 (2006). 
 11
the probabilities of each outcome in the decision tree (by using the relative popularity of each li-
cense type as a probability of occurrence of this license type and deconstructing the user deci-
sion process into a sequence of individual decisions relating to each of the defining properties of 
CC licenses: NC, ND, SA14). In most cases we will use a range of probabilities as not all search 
methods we employed returned the exact same results. The combined result is shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Decision tree for average author using the Internet as his/her main distribution channel. 
Each shaded box represents a decision point and each link has a probability range attached to it 
based on earlier findings on the popularity of CC license types 
 
For completeness we have added decision point D0, which represents the decision to invest the 
time and effort it takes to discover, review and evaluate alternatives to full copyright restrictions. 
Many authors will simply publish their work under the existing copyright regime because this re-
quires no additional effort on their side, or because they are not even aware of the alternatives. 
With some probability X0 an author will consider and evaluate alternative licensing options. We 
cannot observe D0 but the mere fact that in the population of authors there is imperfect informa-
tion on CC and similar licenses (combined with the fact that copyright protection is automatic) 
suggests that D0 must exist and that X0 depends on the costs associated with obtaining this in-
formation. Authors who do choose to incur these (search) costs will in turn choose to adopt a 
model like CC in decision point D1 with probability X1 or will prefer full copyright protection with 
probability 1-X1. Similarly to X0, we cannot observe X1, because of the automatic application of 
copyright law at the birth of a work. However, unlike X0, it is possible to observe X1 in an experi-
                                                 
14 In Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi, Measuring the Commons, presented at the 3rd Sumposium on Statistical 
Challenges in E-Commerce Research, May 15-17, at the University of Connecticut. In this paper we present 
data on the relative popularity of each of the 6 major CC license types, collected with three different methods 
(backlink search, CC-Search and dictionary search), utilizing Yahoo’s and Google’s advanced search func-
tions. Contact the authors for a copy of the paper. 
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mental setup where a controlled user group is given different licensing options, including full 
copyright protection. Such an experiment is left for future research. 
 
By combining the picture in Figure 3 with our previous discussion of incentives and trade-offs we 
can reach the following conclusions: 
 
• D2 (choice of NC constraint): An author who permits non-commercial distribution of 
his/her work is almost twice as likely to forbid commercial distribution of the work rather 
than allow it. It follows that for the average author the potential losses from permitting 
commercial distribution without compensation outweigh the potential benefits of addi-
tional reputation gains or any ideological/altruistic motivations that the author may have 
for licensing more liberally (unless the author’s ideological stance towards liberal licens-
ing is limited to non-commercial uses and thus does not welcome commercial exploita-
tion).  
 
• D3 (choice of ND constraint): We notice that authors are 3 to 5 times more likely to forbid 
the creation of derivatives when the scope of derivatives is already limited to non-
commercial only. This is interesting as the authors who stand to lose more financially are 
those who also allow for commercial uses, as we have discussed. This leads us to be-
lieve that authors who allow for commercial uses of their work are definitely not financially 
motivated and act mostly on conviction or altruism, or, at most with the expectation of 
some future financial gains through gains in reputation. On the other extreme, authors 
who only allow non-commercial uses of their work appear to be concerned about compe-
tition and potential missed financial opportunities and are thus more keen to forbid non-
commercial derivatives, even if the potential impact of those derivatives on the market is 
doubtful and would be only indirect (due to their non-commercial nature).15  
 
• D4 (choice of SA constraint): Interestingly, even if our analysis of D3 signifies the exis-
tence of two different mindsets in the community of authors (as defined by their prefer-
ence or dislike for the NC constraint), when it comes to the share-alike constraint, the two 
groups not only ‘share alike’, but also think alike, favoring the application of the share-
alike constraint to the same extent. We cannot say with confidence how much they really 
favor share-alike, as we are observing the combined effect of original works being li-
censed with share-alike and derivative works being forced to use ‘share-alike’ due to their 
re-use of at least one original work incorporating that constraint. It is nevertheless inter-
esting to note that the appeal of the ‘tit-for-tat’ concept of fairness in ‘share-alike’ appears 
to be independent of other author preferences.. 
On perceptions of value and the role of reputation gains 
With respect to the decisions on derivatives (D3), we should note at this point that the common 
assumption of the existence of two author groups, one being motivated by financial gain and the 
other by other, more altruistic/ideological and non-financial incentives is a sufficient explanation of 
observed behavior only in the case where authors in the two groups have the same (rational or 
irrational) expectations of the commercial viability of their work. If authors have different percep-
tions of commercial viability, we would expect some to be more protective of their content than 
others.  
 
This behavior may be rational (when content of similar quality is of higher value to the author as a 
source of income), or irrational (when the subjective expectations of the author with respect to the 
                                                 
15 If these authors were primarily motivated by ideology or altruism and just favored non-commercial 
sharing because commercial exploitation would not have been compatible with their aims and beliefs, 
then we would also expect them to display a strong preference for non-commercial derivatives, which is 
not the case. 
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appeal of the work are much higher than the actual market valuation of the work). It may therefore 
be that some of the authors who allow for commercial uses of their work are not so much moti-
vated by ideology or altruism but rather have a lower expectation of the financial returns that their 
work can generate and are thus keen to license it more liberally to benefit from increased distribu-
tion and, consequently, increased visibility and reputation.  
 
However, it is wrong to assume that allowing for commercial derivatives is only an additional 
means of increasing visibility without any financial loss. Commercial derivatives will only be cre-
ated if there is financial incentive to do so, which would imply that the work has commercial value, 
if not as an original work, than as raw material for derivative works (for example, music and spe-
cial effects material can be much more valuable when incorporated into the soundtrack of a suc-
cessful movie or ad campaign rather than as stand-alone works). It follows that to explain the ob-
served preferences we need to make the assumption that users who permit commercial uses 
have either: 
 
a) a low expectation of the commercial value of their work, or… 
b) are strongly ideologically motivated, or…  
c) act on altruistic motivation 
 
In all of these cases they will choose the most liberal licensing possible under this framework (i.e. 
by and by-sa), with no particular reason to choose by-nd. On the other hand, those who choose 
to permit only non-commercial uses have either: 
 
a) a high expectation of the commercial value of their work, or… 
b) are ideologically motivated but consider commercial exploitation to be incompatible with 
this motivation 
 
These authors will choose the more restrictive licenses in the framework (by-nc, by-nc-sa, by-nc-
nd) but will be more divided when it comes to their preference for by-nc-nd, as in case (a) they 
will value the ND constraint much more highly than in case (b), depending also on the author’s 
expectation of the value of the work as re-usable material for the creation of derivative works. 
This is indeed what we observe in the probability of outcomes in Figure 3. We have thus estab-
lished that while reputation gains through increased distribution and reuse may play a role in an 
author’s decision (D1) to adopt CC, they do not influence licensing decisions within the CC 
framework (decisions D2, D3 and D4). The latter are driven by the author’s expectation of the com-
mercial value of the work, and/or by ideological/altruistic motivations. 
Community and medium type 
We will now examine the influence of the community (and the medium type, which is usually tied 
to the community) on individual author choice. We would generally expect the attitudes and pref-
erences of the community to exert some influence on the individual decisions of members. As we 
have already mentioned, the use of CC licenses on Flickr exhibits a somewhat different pattern 
compared to general CC-licensing preferences. We show the decision tree for Flickr in Figure 4. 
We notice again a preference for not permitting commercial uses, which is even stronger in the 
Flickr community than on average, and the same pattern for derivative works, though again with a 
higher tendency not to permit adaptation. This leads us to believe that Flickr users license content 
similarly to the average CC adopter, but more conservatively in some respects. One reason for 
this can be privacy concerns. Unlike with music, which is still for all intents and purposes an art 
form, photography is also used for documentation. Many photographs may include images of the 
author and his/her relatives and friends, so the author may wish to protect this content from 
commercial exploitation and derivative use.16
 
                                                 
16 The same would be true for video. 
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The relatively strong preference for by-nc-nd may also be related to the fact that photographs are 
often not as commercially valuable as music or movies as stand-alone products, but rather as 
illustration material for magazine articles, books, advertisements or news reports. Photographers 
may therefore wish to limit the creation of derivative works as much as possible, to demand a fee 
for every derivative use. This later point regarding the use of photographs for illustration may be a 
strong motivation behind the choices we observe, but is factually incorrect as the inclusion of a 
photograph without modification in an article of any type does not constitute a derivative work. 
This is in direct contrast to the use of music for movie soundtracks, as typically the recording 
needs to be cut into smaller parts and synched to the relevant movie scenes, hence leading to a 
soundtrack which is clearly a derivative of the original track. 
 
Interestingly, preferences for the share-alike constraint appear to depend this time on the deci-
sion to allow commercial derivatives, unlike in the general case where they were independent of 
this constraint. The difference stems from the group of authors permitting commercial uses, who 
in Flickr tend to use by-sa less frequently (with a probability of 0.42 instead of 0.60-0.62 for the 
average user). The explanation for this may lie in the fact that Flickr contains a large number of 
amateur photographers with no artistic or commercial aspirations (and presumably with no pri-
vacy concerns, which would lead them to be more protective of the content).17 When such au-
thors choose a more liberal license it would be rational to choose one of the most liberal licenses 
possible, as their content has no commercial value, and little, if any value as material for deriva-
tive works. For these authors the application of the share-alike constraint is probably less mean-
ingful as they do not expect their work to be used in any derivative works.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Decision tree for the average Flickr user adopting CC 
 
Table 2: License mix for some online communities utilizing CC licenses 
Websites Media BY BY-SA BY-ND BY-NC BY-NC-SA BY-NC-ND S+ NC-S+ Free Art Total
Flickr Photo 11% 8% 4% 14% 28% 36% 0% 0% 0% 100%
blip.tv Video 2% 16% 0% 0% 0% 100%
ccMixter (Samples) Audio 69% 0% 0% 26% 0% 0% 3% 1% 0% 100%
ccMixter (A Cappellas) Audio 45% 0% 0% 51% 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 100%
Jamendo Audio 1% 8% 1% 1% 49% 27% 0% 8% 5% 100%
32% 50%
 
 
                                                 
17 Photographs of public buildings and landscapes taken during vacation would be an example of such 
works. 
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We see that the medium and the membership (i.e. the characteristics of the members) of a com-
munity also play a role in the licensing decisions of individual authors. Table 2 shows some data 
collected from online communities known to host CC content. Sampling Plus (S+) and Non-
Commercial Sampling Plus (NC-S+) are CC licenses tailored for audio content, whereas Free Art 
is a ‘copyleft’ license for artistic works. Most of the content on these communities is licensed un-
der the main CC licenses we have been examining. We notice that blip.tv users license video in 
similar terms to Flickr users, which is rather more conservatively than the average CC user.  
 
On the other hand, ccmixter data, which refers to audio files, shows more liberal licensing, with 
the majority of files licensed under by and by-nc. This may lead us to believe that video is typi-
cally licensed under more restrictive terms like photography, whereas audio is licensed more lib-
erally. However, if we look at data from Jamendo, which is also a music community, the majority 
of the content is licensed under the two most restrictive licenses, by-nc-sa and by-nc-nd, in a way 
similar to Flickr and blip.tv. Different communities appear to be licensing content in different ways, 
independent of the medium. However, there is more information in this small dataset: the data on 
ccmixter is only for ‘samples’, i.e. for audio content whose main purpose is to be re-used in de-
rivative works. It is natural to expect that such content will not be licensed with a restriction on the 
creation of derivative works, as this would negate its very purpose. The fact that it is also not li-
censed with a share-alike constraint is perhaps more indicative of the character of this community, 
which appears to favor more liberal licensing, i.e. by and by-nc instead of by-sa or by-nc-sa. 
There is also the practical consideration that by avoiding the use of SA one avoids potential in-
compatibilities in derivatives which utilize more than one original work, as already discussed. In 
conclusion, several factors influence licensing decisions within a community: the aims of the 
community, the membership of the community, the medium type that the community is focusing 
on, and the licensing, sharing and re-use practices within the community. 
Environment 
In this section we will examine to what extent the social, legal, cultural and economic environment 
in which authors act influences licensing choices and attitudes towards intellectual property. Even 
if most CC users use the Internet as their main distribution channel and are members of cross-
border online communities, the debate on IP rights, DRM and piracy is taking place online as well 
as offline and we should expect licensing decisions to be influenced by the history and idiosyn-
crasies of the countries of origin of the authors. In this section we will be forced to move beyond 
the well-defined confounds of the decision analysis which guided us through the paper so far, as 
we will have to examine how the confluence of a large number of diverse factors from the envi-
ronment influences licensing decisions in complex ways. Sometimes we will have to resort to 
qualitative data and anecdotal evidence. Also, at the 2007 iCommons Summit, a yearly gathering 
of CC supporters and related communities and organizations, we had the chance to discuss our 
findings with several of the local and global leaders of the CC movement and also conducted a 
small scale survey of CC jurisdiction teams18. These interactions and the survey yielded more 
                                                 
18 We received 15 complete replies to our survey, from 14 countries. Of the 33 jurisdictions in our data set, 
only 8 are represented in this survey, so we will not place much emphasis on this very limited  dataset in this 
paper, but will take into account some of the information we were able to collect at the summit where appro-
priate. CC volunteers translating and promoting the licenses in different countries were asked to: (A) indicate 
the level of awareness of CC licenses in their country, as they perceive it, in a scale of 1—5 and list specific 
events which have influenced this awareness; (B) comment on the data we collected on their country (if any) 
with respect to license volume and license mix; (C) comment on the general attitude of the public and policy 
makers in their country with respect to the existing copyright regime, file sharing and DRM. From the replies 
we were able to collect we observe the following general patterns: (A) awareness is assumed to be relatively 
low in most countries with most respondents rating the awareness in their country in a range of 1—3 out of 5; 
also, the launch and other promotional events as well as the adoption of the licenses by bloggers, prominent 
local communities and government were listed as having contributed to general awareness of CC; (B) au-
thors often choose more restrictive licenses either because they are cautious in their initial use of the li-
censes (and the expectation is that they will license more liberally in the future) or because they perceive the 
licenses as a means of protecting their work rather than a means of waiving some of the rights granted by 
law (a misperception which could be attributed either to the authors’ poor understanding of copyright law, or 
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insight into factors influencing CC adoption and use which would have otherwise been hard or 
impossible to observe independently. 
Jurisdiction-specific licenses 
All the basic 6 CC license types are available in multiple versions: a generic version, which is the 
oldest and most widely used in the US and around the world, and jurisdiction-specific versions, 
tailored to the legal language and tradition of each jurisdiction, with an active CC team of volun-
teers promoting use of the licenses in each jurisdiction. The generic license is used throughout 
most of the English-speaking world and by most (US-based) online communities. For example, a 
French user of Flickr can only select a generic CC license on this community, even if French ver-
sions of the licenses exist. However, many local online communities around the world are adopt-
ing jurisdiction specific licenses instead of the generic version, which means that by examining 
the data we have collected on these licenses we can produce a picture of how authors license 
works in the different countries.  
 
Jurisdiction-specific licenses comprise only 20% of the total CC pool; however this is still a large 
number (almost 8 million items according to Yahoo search data we have collected, rising to 12 
million, if we take into account our total estimate of 60 million CC-licensed items on the Web, as 
discussed earlier in the paper). We therefore believe that this data merits more attention as it pro-
vides us with a unique opportunity to study licensing behavior across not only a spectrum of op-
tions, but also across many countries. We have included 33 jurisdictions in our data set, shown in 
Table 3. Each jurisdiction exhibits a different level of adoption of Creative Commons licenses and 
a different license mix (i.e. relative preference for more restrictive or more liberal licenses). We 
attempt to decipher the determinants of these differences in license adoption and licensing pref-
erences by comparing the data we have collected on CC-licensed items per jurisdiction with 
country-level indicators. So far we have included GDP, Piracy rates 19 , Internet subscribers, 
Broadband Penetration and Unemployment, as well as Political, Economic and Press Freedom 
indices in our analysis. We compare these indices to CC volume and license mix data from our 
Yahoo and Google backlink search methods which provide the most comprehensive view of CC 
adoption across jurisdictions. 
 
Table 3: CC jurisdictions included in our analysis 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China  
Colombia 
Croatia 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
S. Korea 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Taiwan 
UK20
 
Table 4 shows all the variables included in our analysis. In the following section we will explain 
how we have produced mixed scores of relative licensing restrictiveness (MYBL and MGBL) for 
each jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to rampant copyright infringement leading authors to believe that by using CC licenses they more effectively 
declare to the world that they want to preserve some exclusive rights to their work); (C) there is a gap be-
tween the general attitudes of the population towards copyright, file-sharing and DRM and public policy 
which is generally against file-sharing and pro-DRM. 
19 We have used BSA data on software piracy as an indicator of piracy rates instead of MPAA/RIAA/IFPI 
data because BSA data is more detailed and we assume that software piracy and digital media piracy are 
strongly correlated at the country level. 
20 There are two CC jurisdictions, UK:England & Wales and UK:Scotland, but for the purposes of this analy-
sis we have grouped them together as other data was available only for the UK as a whole 
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Table 4: Analysis variables 
Variable Description Source
MYBL Mixed score according to YBL Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi (2007)
MGBL Mixed score according to GBL Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi (2007)
VOL Absolute volume according to YBL Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi (2007)
VYBL Volume per capita according to YBL Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi (2007)
VGBL Volume per capita according to GBL Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi (2007)
PIR Software piracy BSA, 2006
INT Internet subscribers per capita OECD, 2003
BRO Broadband subscribers per capita OECD, 2003
GDP GDP per capita IMF World Economic Outlook, 2006
UNE Unemployment IMF World Economic Outlook, 2006
POF Political freedom Freedom in the World, Freedom House, 2006
ECF Economic freedom Wall Street Journal & Heritage Foundation, 2006
PRF Press freedom Reporters Without Borders, 2006
DAT Date of introduction of CC licenses Mike Linksvayer, VP, Creative Commons  
License scores 
To make a comparison of the relative permissiveness/restrictiveness of licensing behavior across 
jurisdictions possible we have devised a simple method of summarizing the relative popularity of 
each of the 6 major CC license types into a number from 1 to 6 which should reflect the relative 
restrictiveness of licensing in a jurisdiction. It is not possible to quantify or measure freedom and 
hence it is not possible to measure how much more restrictive one license is compared to another. 
Nevertheless, we will attempt to order the licenses from more restrictive (by-nc-nd) to more liberal 
(by), as shown in the first row of license scores in Table 5. We call this “commercial freedom” be-
cause this scoring/ordering of the licenses from 6 (most liberal) to 1 (most restrictive) places for 
example by-nc below by-nd, and while it may be true that for someone interested in commercial 
exploitation of a work, by-nc is more restrictive, for someone interested in the creative freedom 
that a license affords, by-nd is much more restrictive as it does not allow for any derivative use. 
We therefore introduce a second scoring of the licenses, based on creative (as opposed to com-
mercial) freedom. As one of the motivations of more liberal licensing models like CC is to promote 
creativity, we feel that it is important to add this dimension. Finally, we take the average of these 
two scores for each license type to produce a “mixed score”, which is a combination (in this case 
the arithmetic average) of the creative and commercial freedom scores of each license, and 
which we expect to be more representative of the average author’s perception of restrictiveness, 
as it incorporates both commercial and creative considerations21.  
 
Table 5: Scoring licenses according to the freedoms they permit 
License BY BY-SA BY-ND BY-NC BY-NC-SA BY-NC-ND
Commercial Freedom 6 5 4 3 2 1
Creative Freedom 6 4 2 5 3 1
Mixed Score 6 4.5 3 4 2.5 1  
 
We can use any of the three rows of scores to calculate a jurisdiction score based on the license 
mix we observe for that jurisdiction. By treating what is essentially an ordering of the licenses as a 
score on a scale of 1 to 6 we produce a somewhat crude but effective way of summarizing the 
relative restrictiveness of licensing in each jurisdiction. If we had the means to actually measure 
the distance between license types on commercial or on creative freedom instead of assuming a 
fixed step size of 1, that would be optimal. An approximate measure of this distance could be pro-
duced by conducting a user survey where we ask users of these licenses to attribute scores to 
the licenses according to their own perceptions of how restrictive the licenses are. Then we could 
use the results of the survey as a scale of the (user-perceived) relative restrictiveness of each 
license type. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper and for our purposes our approach 
will suffice.  
 
                                                 
21 For the complete argumentation on the relative license scores, see Cheliotis, Guglani and Tayi, Measuring 
the Commons, presented at the 3rd Symposium on Statistical Challenges in E-Commerce Research, May 
15-17, at the University of Connecticut. Contact the authors for a copy of the paper. 
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Figure 5: Calculation of jurisdiction scores based on the mixed scores of licenses 
 
Figure 5 shows diagrammatically how we calculate a rating for each jurisdiction based on the 
mixed scores of each license type and the relative percentage use of each license type in the 
jurisdiction. We note that according to the mixed scores by and by-nc-nd remain at the extremes 
of the most permissive (6) and most restrictive (1) scores respectively. Share-alike licenses (by-
sa and by-nc-sa) move half a step towards the middle which reflects the fact that the share-alike 
constraint impacts commercial freedom (some business models will not be compatible with the 
liberal model of CC licensing) and creative freedom (because of the possible licensing gridlock 
that share-alike can cause, as we have already discussed). Most notably by-nc and by-nd switch 
places (compared to the commercial freedom scores where by-nc has a score of 3 and by-nd a 
score of 4). This is because by-nd is a serious constraint on creativity, much more so than by-nc.  
 
We can also provide intuitive support for the appropriateness of the mixed scores. We have ob-
served in our analysis of individual author decisions that authors are driven either by their expec-
tation of their work’s market value or by ideological conviction and/or altruism. The former group, 
when valuing their content highly, will tend to use by-nc-nd and by-nc-sa, the most restrictive li-
censes, with by-nc lagging clearly behind in their preferences. The latter group, especially those 
who are altruistic in their behavior, tend to prefer by and by-sa, with by-nd being much more un-
popular. By placing by-nc and by-nd further away from the left (respectively right) end of the1—6 
scale we reflect essentially the observation that these licenses are the least popular among the 
groups of authors who allow (respectively disallow) commercial uses of their work. Given that we 
can also find intuitive and logical support for the mixed scores we will prefer using them in our 
analysis, even if they do have shortcomings22. Finally, we should note that the analyses that fol-
low do use mixed scores as we find them to be more appropriate, but the conclusions of these 
analyses would have been the same if we had used only commercial freedom scores. 
Correlation analysis 
We have shown in Table 4 the variables we have included in our analysis. YBL stands for Yahoo 
BackLinks and GBL for Google BackLinks, two of the methods we used for collecting CC usage 
data. MYBL and MGBL are the mixed scores for a jurisdiction, based on the method we have il-
lustrated in Figure 5. VOL is the (absolute) volume of licenses according to YBL. VYBL and VGBL 
are the volume of CC-licensed items per jurisdiction according to YBL and GBL data respectively. 
CC launch dates, piracy rates and GDP per capita are available for all 33 jurisdictions and Table 
6 shows the correlation coefficients for these jurisdictions. We observe that volume numbers ac-
cording to YBL and GBL are highly correlated, and the mixed scores across the two search meth-
ods are also correlated, though not as strongly. We also observe the well-known fact that piracy 
                                                 
22 Namely they are based on placing the licenses in equidistant intervals on a ‘freedom scale’, instead of 
being based on an objective and verifiable measure of the relative restrictiveness. 
 19
rates and GDP are negatively correlated but we do not observe a relationship between either vol-
ume or license mix and GDP or piracy. 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix for all CC jurisdictions 
All 33 MYBL MGBL VOL VYBL VGBL PIR GDP DAT
MYBL 1.00
MGBL 0.67 1.00
VOL -0.10 -0.11 1.00
VYBL -0.03 -0.09 0.85 1.00
VGBL 0.12 0.08 0.75 0.90 1.00
PIR -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.18 -0.17 1.00
GDP -0.08 -0.09 0.26 0.29 0.32 -0.84 1.00
DAT -0.01 0.17 -0.44 -0.46 -0.38 0.46 -0.46 1.00  
 
Absolute volume (VOL) is highly correlated with volume per capita (VYBL and VGBL). With re-
spect to the launch dates, we observe some weak negative correlation between launch dates and 
license volume (absolute and per capita), which is expected, as jurisdictions where the licenses 
have been introduced earlier should naturally exhibit a higher volume. But why is the correlation 
not stronger? Figure 6 shows a plot of absolute license volume versus launch dates, while Figure 
7 shows the same picture for volume per capita. From both figures we can verify that indeed ju-
risdictions where the licenses have been introduced more recently exhibit lower absolute and per 
capita volume. However, there are significant differences between jurisdictions with launch dates 
not very far apart and these differences increase in proportion to the age of the jurisdiction-
specific licenses (the plots are on a log scale, so differences between jurisdictions on the left side 
of the plot are much larger than on the right). This is why the correlation coefficients and the R2 
values are relatively low.  
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Figure 6: Absolute license volume versus date of CC license introduction. Note that the vertical axis 
is in log scale and thus the fitted curve is exponential. 
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Figure 7: License volume per capita versus date of CC license introduction. Note that the vertical 
axis is in log scale and thus the fitted curve is exponential. 
 
Thus we can say that ‘younger’ jurisdictions naturally cannot exhibit high volumes, but for many 
jurisdictions other factors besides launch dates must be leading to the significant differences in 
adoption (which for some countries are more pronounced on a per capita basis, although for most 
their positions on the two plots are similar – with China being a notable exception). The fitted (ex-
ponential, as the plots are in log scale) curves can be used as an approximate means of deter-
mining whether a jurisdiction exhibits a license adoption that is average for its ‘age’, or not. 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe which countries have been early versus late adopters of 
CC licenses23. Figure 8 is helpful in this respect as it shows a plot of GDP per capita versus 
launch dates. Although GDP is only one of many indicators of a country’s relevant characteristics, 
we observe that the early adopters of CC have all been countries with a relatively high GDP per 
capita, with the only exceptions of Brazil, and later, Taiwan. We see an interesting geographical 
spread pattern along the GDP dimension, where CC licenses are (invented and) promoted first in 
the ‘first world’ but then quickly spreading to many poorer countries, with some ‘laggard’ devel-
oped nations joining as well over time (UK, Sweden, Denmark on the plot). The mostly European 
early adopters exhibit high (absolute and per capita) license volume and thus account for most of 
the total jurisdiction-specific volume, although their licensing preferences vary greatly, as we will 
show. As the CC movement grows and becomes truly global the set of countries adopting CC 
becomes increasingly diverse, encompassing jurisdictions with different cultures, social structures 
and levels of economic prosperity. We will examine some of these differences and how they may 
be impacting licensing choices later in the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Of course chance also plays a role, as by countries adopting CC licenses we do not mean that the coun-
tries officially decide to adopt CC, but rather that a small team of volunteers in the respective countries de-
sign and  launch the jurisdiction-specific licenses in coordination with CC-international. 
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Figure 8: GDP per capita (in USD) versus date of CC license introduction. 
 
After having examined the impact of CC launch dates on the data, we return to our earlier obser-
vation on the relationship between piracy and GDP. Figure 9 shows all the jurisdictions on a pi-
racy versus GDP per capita plot.  
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Figure 9: Plot of CC jurisdictions’ piracy rates versus GDP per capita. Bubble surface size is license 
adoption per capita. Europe shaded deep gray, Asia light gray, South America shaded with lines, 
and Others have no shading. 
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We note that the jurisdictions with the highest CC adoption per capita have an average piracy 
rate (also, those with the highest per capita and absolute CC volume24 are those with average-to-
high GDP per capita). Based on this observation we form a hypothesis that relatively high piracy 
rates in developed countries may be indicative of a rather lax or critical view in the population with 
respect to copyright protection and this may be providing fertile ground for more liberal licensing 
models like CC. We therefore examine more closely the top 14 economies with GDP per capita 
greater than US$25,000. The correlation coefficients for these countries are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix for top economies 
Top 14 MYBL MGBL VOL VYBL VGBL PIR INT BRO GDP UNE POF ECF PRF DAT
MYBL 1.00
MGBL 0.55 1.00
VOL -0.02 0.06 1.00
VYBL 0.01 0.12 0.88 1.00
VGBL 0.06 0.16 0.83 0.96 1.00
PIR -0.25 -0.23 0.73 0.68 0.67 1.00
INT 0.07 0.38 -0.64 -0.62 -0.59 -0.63 1.00
BRO 0.19 0.36 -0.48 -0.30 -0.29 -0.47 0.49 1.00
GDP -0.03 0.32 -0.76 -0.68 -0.63 -0.64 0.86 0.60 1.00
UNE -0.15 -0.11 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.54 -0.64 -0.31 -0.51 1.00
POF N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.00
ECF 0.11 0.08 -0.46 -0.53 -0.35 -0.41 0.56 0.10 0.62 -0.26 N/A 1.00
PRF 0.30 0.27 -0.47 -0.45 -0.39 -0.55 0.68 0.41 0.67 -0.35 N/A 0.73 1.00
DAT -0.06 0.29 -0.28 -0.23 -0.22 -0.12 0.39 0.11 0.64 -0.29 N/A 0.30 0.26 1.00  
 
Table 7 includes more variables as more data is readily available for these countries. First, all of 
these countries have the same high political freedom rating (POF) and generally high economic 
and press freedom ratings. More importantly we notice now some positive correlation between 
piracy rates (which are again correlated with GDP) and license volume (VYBL and VGBL). Ac-
cording to these results we can say that the biggest adopters of CC licenses are developed coun-
tries with high political and economic freedom and relatively high piracy rates (lower GDP per 
capita) compared to other developed countries25. This is nevertheless no proof of causation and 
moreover, if we plot license adoption per capita against piracy rates we do not observe a clear 
relationship between the two. 
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Figure 10: License adoption per capita versus piracy rates for top economies  
 
In conclusion, we have found only weak support for our hypothesis that a relatively lax or critical 
view on copyright protection is providing fertile ground for more liberal licenses. This is logical 
                                                 
24 We have not included a plot of absolute license volumes per jurisdiction as volume per capita is generally 
a more appropriate measure of adoption and we therefore want to focus our attention to this measure.   
25 The results are the same even if we remove Spain, which, as we will show later, benefits from South 
American authors using the Spanish license. 
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after all, because even if some authors may be motivated to use CC licenses because they are 
critical towards the restrictions imposed by intellectual property law, there are other reasons why 
one would use such licenses, as we have shown in the analysis of the decision tree in Figure 3.  
Geopolitical, legal and social analysis 
So far we have not been able to provide an explanation for the differences in license mix across 
jurisdictions and only weak evidence for a relationship between license volume and piracy rates. 
It is likely that a multitude of factors influence license choice in complex ways, making analysis 
more difficult. To get a sense for how jurisdictions compare on both license adoption per capita 
and license mix, we utilize the mixed scores we proposed to summarize licensing restrictiveness 
and produce the plot in Figure 11. The size of each bubble is the absolute volume of licenses per 
jurisdiction. Countries on the top right end of the plot exhibit the highest per capita adoption of the 
licenses and the most liberal licensing. 
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Figure 11: Plot of jurisdictions’ CC license volume per 1000 inhabitants versus license mix (relative 
restrictiveness of the licensing based on mixed scores26).  Bubble surface size is absolute CC li-
cense volume per jurisdiction. Europe shaded deep gray, Asia light gray, South America shaded 
with lines, and Others have no shading. Notice that the vertical axis is in log scale. 
 
In this section we will discuss some known facts regarding the political, social and legal back-
ground of the jurisdictions and will attempt to look for contextual factors which may provide some 
explanation for the position of a jurisdiction on Figure 11 and/or for the positions of jurisdictions 
relative to each other. A complete analysis on all relevant dimensions of all the jurisdictions is 
beyond the scope of the paper, but we hope to provide some intuition with respect to (and kick-
start more interest and study on) how relationships at the ‘macro’ level of countries and geo-
graphical regions may be affecting the ‘micro’ level of individual author choice. We hope that this 
                                                 
26 We checked the robustness of the relationships suggested by Figure 11 with respect to the definition of 
the x-axis, by producing the same plot using commercial freedom scores instead of mixed scores. The rela-
tive positions of the bubbles vary only slightly (most notably Israel shifts to the right of Sweden). These 
changes do not affect the observations we make in this paper. 
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initial analysis will spur more in-depth region- or country-specific investigations by other re-
searchers. 
Spain 
We immediately notice in Figure 11 the special position of Spain, where the Spanish licenses are 
popular, in absolute terms and per capita and they are used in a very liberal way compared to any 
other high volume jurisdictions. Besides the fact that Spain has been an early adopter of CC, in 
correspondence with the Spanish and South American CC jurisdiction teams they both pointed 
out to us that Spanish licenses are also popular in South America, as the language in most of 
these countries is practically the same, and both Spanish and South American authors are bound 
to be members of some of the same Spanish language communities.  
 
Nevertheless, besides the contributions of South American authors, there is reason to believe 
that the awareness of CC licenses in Spain itself is high. The CC launch event (October 2004) 
and the Copyfight event (July 2005) have likely increased awareness, but a recent (March 2006) 
and widely publicized court case regarding the streaming of royalty-free music from the Internet in 
bars has probably also contributed to a heightened awareness and sensitization to intellectual 
property issues in Spain27. We therefore assume that Spain holds a special position among CC 
jurisdictions mainly because of two contributing factors: language and high license awareness 
and promotion. Moreover, Spain is among those countries with a relatively matured information 
society and developed economy which nevertheless exhibit relatively high piracy rates (and low-
to-zero levels of litigation against piracy and file-sharing). This also places Spain in the group of 
countries where liberal licensing approaches may be benefiting from a general social attitude that 
is friendly towards sharing and a public policy that is not favoring the persecution of individual file-
sharers.  
Croatia 
Croatia is similar to Spain in combining high adoption per capita with liberal licensing, even if 
Croatia’s absolute volume is naturally lower. Croatia has been an early adopter of CC. The 2007 
iCommons Summit, the largest yearly CC-related event, was held in Croatia. Also, from the Croa-
tian CC jurisdiction team we learn that bloggers in Croatia are known to have adopted CC li-
censes in large numbers and awareness among artists and in parts of the government is rela-
tively high. Also, it is interesting to note that Croatia, like Bulgaria which we will examine a bit later, 
exhibits one of the highest piracy rates in Europe.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the Croatian CC team appears to have been very active and effective 
in promoting the licenses, as is the case with the Spanish team. Without implying that these 
teams have been better in execution than other CC jurisdiction teams, from informal discussions, 
and the survey we conducted during the 2007 iCommons Summit we have come to believe that, 
other things being equal, the personality, drive and network of the teams of volunteers in each 
jurisdiction are critical factors influencing both adoption and the relative restrictiveness of licens-
ing. Together with the leaders and supporters of CC-friendly movements (such as local blogging 
communities and OSS projects) these individuals form a local pro-sharing avant-garde which we 
believe can be critical to the success of CC in a jurisdiction, especially in the very early stages of 
low general awareness in the population. A similar argument can be made for Sweden (see be-
low) and probably also for other jurisdictions. We currently cannot provide hard evidence for this, 
so it is only an assertion on our part, which nevertheless is consistent with observations made 
with respect to the reputation and networks of participants as contributing factors for the success 
of OSS projects28.  
                                                 
27A Badajoz court (the Juzgado de Primera Instancia nùmero 6 de Badajoz) ruled that the Metropol bar must 
not pay royalties to an Authors society, because it only plays royalty-free music.27
28 Several factors have been studied with respect to how they contribute to the success of OSS projects: 
project age, intended audience, the reputation of the participants, license restrictiveness and the level of 
public organizational support are some of the factors that have been found to have a positive effect. See 
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Sweden and Bulgaria 
Swedish, Bulgarian and Israeli licenses are used very liberally. As these countries have very little 
in common in terms of sociopolitical or historical background it is not so helpful to examine them 
as a group. We currently do not have any information on Israel, so we will limit our discussion to 
Sweden and Bulgaria, while focusing more on Sweden, as recent developments in this country 
have received worldwide attention. Sweden is famous for the May 31st 2006 police raid on Pirate 
Bay, one of the most popular Bittorrent sites, used mostly for downloading popular movies. The 
police raid on Pirate Bay led to backlash by some parts of Swedish society, as it was perceived 
as an outside intervention by the US-based MPAA. Supporters of Pirate Bay sometimes argue 
that file sharing is an accepted social practice in Sweden29 and this move was seen as Swedish 
authorities giving in to pressure from the US. This situation has led to the radicalization of part of 
the population and the adoption of an open pro-piracy stance, whose most famous offspring is the 
Pirate Party, a pro-piracy political party30. Sweden is also the home of the Pirate Bureau (Pirat-
byran), an ad hoc pro-piracy think-tank predating both the Pirate Bay and the Pirate Party.31
 
The very liberal licensing of CC adopters in Sweden may therefore be connected to our earlier 
hypothesis on the relation between piracy rates and CC adoption. Sweden’s piracy rates are 
generally very moderate, but it may be that the piracy-related radicalization of a small part of the 
society and the general sensitization of the population on copyright issues has indeed led to very 
liberal CC licensing.  
 
Another contributing factor may be the liberal-socialist political tradition of Sweden and to some 
extent of all of the Scandinavian countries. Finland is also exhibiting a liberal licensing pattern. 
Denmark appears to be licensing conservatively in comparison, however we can see in Table 8 
that a small number of countries exhibit significant differences between our YBL and GBL meas-
urements and Denmark is one of them. Although the GBL sample set is smaller and therefore 
more prone to statistical error, Denmark is one of only two countries which according to GBL re-
sults are licensing much more liberally (the other one is Malta, whose sample size is so small that 
it is no surprise that we see a great difference between YBL and GBL estimates). 
 
Table 8: Difference in mixed scores: YBL – GBL 
Argentina -0.22 Denmark -2.00 Netherlands 0.05 
Australia -0.10 Finland -0.19 Peru -0.16 
Austria -0.10 France -0.34 Poland -0.57 
Belgium -0.23 Germany -0.09 Portugal -0.19 
Brazil -0.28 Hungary -0.20 S. Korea -0.30 
Bulgaria -0.93 Israel -0.07 Slovenia -0.24 
Canada -0.02 Italy -0.03 South Africa -0.60 
Chile -0.68 Japan -0.07 Spain -0.61 
China -0.12 Malaysia 0.20 Sweden 0.75 
                                                                                                                                                 
Stewart, Ammeter and Maruping,  Impacts of License Choice and Organizational Sponsorship on User In-
terest and Development Activity in Open Source Software Projects, ISR, Vol. 17 ,  Issue 2  (June 2006), pp: 
126-144; Chengalur-Smith and Sidorova, Survival of open-source projects: A population ecology perspective, 
in Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Inf. Systems, Assoc. for Inf. Systems 2003; Crowston 
and Scozzi, Open source software projects as virtual organisations: competency rallying for software devel-
opment, IEE Proc. Software, 149(1) 3-17. 
29 File-sharing has been made illegal in Sweden since 2005 (so it is not true that it is exempted from protec-
tion or that it does not constitute infringement), however, the penalty is relatively low (fine only) and en-
forcement is not strong (due to privacy rights and popular support for file-sharing and shared culture). See 
http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSL1220452220070612. 
30 The Pirate Party’s simple political agenda is summarized in their homepage: “The Pirate Party wants to 
fundamentally reform copyright law, get rid of the patent system, and ensure that citizens' rights to privacy 
are respected.” (http://www.piratpartiet.se/the_pirate_party) 
31 See http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/08/71544. 
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Colombia 0.19 Malta -2.15 Taiwan -0.46 
Croatia 0.48 Mexico -0.06 UK 0.15 
 
Finally, according to the Bulgarian CC team, Bulgaria has strong (though less publicized interna-
tionally compared to Sweden’s) anti-copyright/pro-piracy, blogging and OSS movements which 
have been quick to embrace CC and are licensing very liberally.  
Europe-overall 
European developed countries have been for the most part very early adopters of CC licenses 
and contribute most of the jurisdiction-specific licensed content (while the US is assumed to ac-
count for a great share of the ‘generic’ CC license adoption). All European jurisdictions exhibit 
moderate to high volume per capita, as we have seen.  
 
It is also interesting to observe in Figure 11 two clusters of European countries: a central Euro-
pean cluster comprising Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary and Poland, as well as a 
Franco-Latin cluster comprising France32, Italy and Belgium. Both clusters exhibit high per capita 
and absolute volume. The Central European cluster however appears to be licensing much more 
liberally than the Franco-Latin cluster33. This clustering may be coincidental and at first it is sur-
prising to observe, but these countries do share borders and have interrelated backgrounds, cul-
ture and history. It is therefore possible that what we observe does reflect real similarities in the 
perception of law and licensing issues in these countries and/or closer collaboration among the 
volunteers who promote the licenses in these geopolitical regions. For example, the headquarters 
of CC International, the organization responsible for the international coordination and promotion 
of the licenses, are in Berlin and the Berlin team collaborates closely with the Dutch team. Com-
mon language and culture may also be responsible for similarities between Germany and Austria, 
while Poland and Hungary share borders and have strong economic ties with Germany and Aus-
tria respectively. In the Franco-Latin cluster, Belgium and Italy share borders with France and one 
of the official languages of Belgium is French. These similarities indicate that the clustering ob-
served in Figure 11 may not be coincidental. 
 
Spain and Portugal appear to be licensing more liberally than either cluster, which may be a re-
flection of a different licensing mentality in these countries, or may also be a reflection of the in-
fluence of Spanish-speaking (respectively Portuguese-speaking, i.e. Brazil) South American au-
thors. In this sense, the use of the Spanish (and perhaps also the Portuguese) license should not 
be interpreted as purely European in origin. 
South America  
Brazil exhibits the highest absolute volume of licenses in South America, which is not surprising 
given the relative size of the country but also given the fact that Brazil became one of the first 
adopters of CC in 2004 (was the third country to join after Japan and Finland). The 2006 iCom-
mons Summit was held in Rio De Janeiro and CC enjoys strong support from the minister of cul-
ture (world-famous musician Gilberto Gil). Finally, very relevant is the popularity of ‘commons-
based’ (as opposed to copyright-based) production models in the country.34
 
                                                 
32 Intellectual property and DRM issues have received significant press attention in France after the introduc-
tion of (and ensuing debate on) DAVDSI: Loi sur le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de 
l'Information 
 
34 For example, Ronaldo Lemos, Professor of Law and head of CC Brazil talks about the Brazilian Tecno-
brega movement in an article in the Miami Herald, In Brazil, performers embrace music pirates 
(http://www.miamiherald.com/213/story/164020.html) and in Good Copy, Bad Copy, a Danish documentary 
film on intellectual property issues directed by A. Johnsen, R. Christensen and H. Moltke 
(http://www.goodcopybadcopy.net/). 
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South American CC teams probably communicate and coordinate with each other frequently due 
to their similar cultures and common language. These similarities may also provide an explana-
tion for the fact that South American jurisdictions are positioned relatively close to each other on 
the plot of Figure 11. See also the later discussion on the digital divide between developed and 
developing countries for additional motivation for the appeal of CC in South America.  
Asia-overall 
Interestingly, Asian jurisdictions appear to be using more restrictive licenses, compared to Europe 
or South America. This may be due to several factors, but it can also be a reflection of a more 
conservative stance towards copyright on the part of these countries (for more on this see the 
next subsection on China), although, unlike South American jurisdictions, Asian jurisdictions are 
positioned further apart from each other in terms of the license mix and in terms of volume per 
capita. This greater distance with respect to license adoption and use may in turn be a reflection 
of the greater geographical, historical and cultural ‘distance’ between the respective countries. 
Also, it is possible (though we cannot substantiate this) that there has been closer collaboration 
among European and especially among South American CC teams than among Asian teams.  
 
Japan has been one of the first CC adopters and stands out for the high volume and liberal li-
censing compared to other Asian jurisdictions. There appears to be very strong support for CC in 
Japan and also corporate interest in the use of the licenses, as exemplified by the recent an-
nouncement that Sony’s Japanese “YouTube”, named eyeVio, will be using CC licenses only for 
all user-submitted content. Also, not coincidentally, the 2008 iCommons Summit is planned to 
take place in Japan. Interestingly South Korea also exhibits very high adoption of the licenses, 
albeit with much more restrictive licensing. Unfortunately we do not have more information on the 
background of South Korea to provide some explanation for this notable difference to Japan (if 
indeed what we observe is correct and not a measurement error, as, for unknown reasons, Ko-
rean CC usage data appears to be much more volatile than that of other jurisdictions35).   
China  
Of particular interest is China, which is a statist-communist country following a socialist continen-
tal legal system that is quite different from the common law and civil law systems,36 but that has 
since embraced facets of capitalism and the market economy into its economic policy. CC li-
censes were only introduced in China in March 2006 but when compared to other jurisdictions 
with similar launch dates and even to many earlier adopters, Chinese licenses exhibit high usage 
volume (though naturally volume per capita is low due to the size of the country). China has 
therefore the potential to become a major CC license adopter, perhaps only second to the US 
and the Spanish-speaking world.  
 
China has only recently built up a body of IP laws and enacted its first set of copyright law, the 
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, in 1991. China also acceded to the Berne Con-
vention in 199237 and to the TRIPs Agreement in 200138.39 Copyright piracy continues to thrive in 
                                                 
35 Source: Mike Linksvayer, Creative Commons VP 
36 For an overview, see Warren Newberry, Copyright Reform in China: A "Trips" Much Shorter and less 
Strange Than Imagined?, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1425 (2003); Gang Yuan, A Comparison of Cyberspace Copy-
right Protection in China and the United States, (2001); Reiko R. Feaver, China’s Copyright Law and the 
TRIPs Agreement, 5 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 431 (1996); and Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal 
and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. Int'l L.J. 81 (1996). 
37 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
38 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 LL.M. 1125 (1994). Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments -- Results of the Uru-
guay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994). China acceded to the WTO in 2001 and the TRIPs 
agreement is a key aspect of WTO accession. See also, Robert Slate, Judicial Copyright Enforcement in 
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China, not only of foreign but also of local works.40 Besides the general observation we have 
made on the relationship between GDP per capita and piracy rates, in the case of China this is 
perhaps due in part to its sociopolitical history.41 Confucianism and communitarianism may have 
played a part in forming the attitudes of its people towards the treatment of creative works. For 
example,42 the rule of law is an emerging but still nebulous concept for legal practitioners in 
China and its history, traditions and culture influence its approach to the treatment of intellectual 
works.43 What about the data showing that Chinese creators do use CC licenses and not very 
                                                                                                                                                 
China: Shaping World Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 665 (2006), illustrating 
the Chinese approach as “TRIPs with Chinese characteristics”.  
39 China promulgated the Regulations on the Implementations of the International Copyright Treaties 70 
(1992) (translated in China L. & Prac., 14 January 1993) and the Implementing Rules for the Copyright 
Law  of the People's Republic of China (1990) (translated in China Law Reference Service ref. no. 
5100/91.05.30 ) to harmonize its laws with the Berne Convention.  
40 See Ralph Oman, Copyright Piracy in China, 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 583 (2006). To avoid dis-
pute from going the route of a formal dispute resolution action in the WTO, China and the United States 
convened a meeting of the United States-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) to dis-
cuss the copyright piracy problem. During the meeting, the USTR expressed dissatisfaction over China’s 
copyright enforcement record and in the course of it noted that Chinese piracy rates continue in the eighty-
five to ninety percent range. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2006 Special 301 Report, 
available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_
upload_file473_9336.pdf. For an different perspective, see Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting 
Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (2000) and Peter K. Yu, A 
Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: From Pirates To 
Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property In Post-WTO China, 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 901 (2006). It is 
acknowledged that for China to improve its copyright protection, it has to consider it to be of domestic inter-
est to do so. One of the ways to do that is to ensure that its own body intellectual works develops to the ex-
tent that they require protection from illegitimate exploitation. See Graham J. Chynoweth, Reality Bites: How 
the Biting Reality of Piracy in China is Working to Strengthen Its Copyright Laws, Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 3 
(2003). For more positive outlook of the future of copyright protection in China, see Wu Shulin, The Condi-
tions of the Judicial and Administrative Protection of Copyright in China, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 241 
(1998) and Chen Zhaokuan, Administrative Management and Enforcement of Copyright in China, 9 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int'l L. 249 (1998);  
41 Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film Piracy and Prospects for the En-
forcement of Copyright Laws, DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 63, 74-83 (2002) [also published in 9 UCLA Ent. L. 
Rev. 389 (2002)]. The author examines the Chinese predispositions and Confucian attitudes including com-
munitarianism, equality and non-competition which all contribute to the lax attitude towards privatization and 
propertization of intellectual works for personal gain and interest. See also Jordana Cornish, Cracks in the 
Great Wall: Why China’s Copyright Law Has Failed to Prevent Piracy of American Movies Within its Borders, 
9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 405, 422-431 (2006), on an analysis of the cultural and ideological differences 
that may, in the words of the author, “impede the “will” of the Chinese people to protect U.S. intellectual 
property rights”. Ibid. at 422. See further, Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 795, 809 (2006) and Kent Hughes, Gang Lin & Jennifer Turner, China and the WTO: 
Domestic Challenges and International Pressures 6 (2002), available at: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/WTOrpt.pdf. 
42 Xu Guoji, a senior official in Shanghai's Industrial and Commercial Administration has been quoted as 
stating that “when it comes to copying a disk, most Chinese people don't see what's wrong”, while comment-
ing on the boom in movie piracy at that time (quoted in Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1998, at D2, and cited in Julia Cheng, China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of 
TRIPs Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1941 (1998) at n1). The 
author further stated that “[t]he idea that property rights can be attached to the intangible workings of the 
mind is new to Chinese culture.” Ibid. at 1951. “The concept of copyright is foreign to Chinese thinking. 74 
While China recognized the right to personal and real property, Chinese culture did not view works of the 
mind as property, therefore authors did not have ownership rights to their creation. 75 Furthermore, in ancient 
China, granting authors ownership rights would have frustrated the emperor’s goal of making ideas widely 
accessible to the people.” Ibid. at 1952. 
43 See William P. Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual Property Trade and Taiwan: 
A GATT-Fly's View, 1992 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 97, 104 (1992). The panel discussed the problems and diffi-
culties that the U.S. and the European countries encountered in introducing intellectual property law to 
China in the early 1900s. See also, Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use 
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liberally as well? This may be interpreted as double standards in that the Chinese creators of 
works are in fact using CC licenses to expressly assert some of the rights to their works in the 
face of rampant piracy while acknowledging the general lack of enforcement against the copying 
and distribution of their works. See also the related discussion below on the developed and de-
veloping country divide. 
USA 
Our analysis does not include the United States as US-based authors use the ‘generic’ licenses 
and these are also used by members of other jurisdictions, making it harder to distinguish be-
tween the two. Hence the US is ‘hidden’ in our dataset. We can however assume that a large 
share of content licensed under the generic license stems from US-based authors. Since the ge-
neric license accounts for about 80% of the total CC volume, it follows that CC adoption in the US 
must be the highest in the world, which is not surprising, as the roots and most prominent sup-
porters of the CC movement are based in the US. Also, the US has been the global epicenter of 
debates (and litigation) relating to copyright and intellectual property rights in general.  
The developed and developing country divide 
We would expect the level of economic development of a country to influence not only its general 
attitude towards intellectual property, but also the licensing behavior of individual authors. It has 
to do with a conflation of several sub-factors affected by lack of resources which in turn affects 
the level of creativity and gives rise to the need for transfer of knowledge and other forms of intel-
lectual resources for economic and social survival and/or progress. At first look we do not notice 
any clear pattern of different licensing behaviors between developed and developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the motivations why authors choose to use a more liberal licensing model like CC 
may differ for these two groups of countries. There is increasing evidence that current intellectual 
property rights laws are harming those they purport to benefit by cutting off the “intellectual com-
mons” to potential future creators and transferring wealth from poor to rich countries.44 Voices 
from the developing world have asserted a counter-discourse to the existing regime that has crys-
tallized under the rubric of Traditional Knowledge (TK), which calls into question the cultural as-
sumptions in the current copyright model and its distributive effects. Their central prescriptive so-
lution calls for a sui generis legal regime to protect community rights,45 while on the other hand 
the legal structure of intellectual property as it is known in developed countries remains mostly 
“irrelevant, unfamiliar and unenforceable”.46
 
Many developing country governments implemented the TRIPS agreement only out of necessity 
for trade reasons and as a matter of law but have failed to follow it up with robust enforce of intel-
lectual property rights in general.47 That is not to say that developing countries have only been 
passively transposing copyright laws formulated mainly by the developed countries like the U.S., 
European Union countries and Japan without attempting to influence changes to the regime 
themselves, albeit in tactical maneuverings in negotiations for copyright amendment in interna-
                                                                                                                                                 
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. Int'l L.J. 1, 33, 69 (2001)  
where the author criticized Western countries for ignoring differences in China’s history, cultural and political 
system in their attempts to foist their ideas of intellectual property rights protection on her. 
44 For instance, price and import control legislation for the same products. The TRIPs regime has been 
touted as having the same effect. See Chander and Sunder 1346-1354. See also, Peter Drahos & John 
Braithwaite, Information Feudalism 11 (2002); Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today 75 (2002), cited in 
Simon at n6. 
45 Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: A Psychological Approach to Conflict-
ing Claims of Creativity in International Law, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1613 (2005). 
46 Ronaldo Lemos, From Legal Commons to Social Commons: Brazil and the Cultural Industry in the 21st 
Century, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford (Working Paper). 
47 See generally Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, 
Coercion, and Choice, 49 Int'l Org. 315 (1995), cited by Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge-Economy Elites, The 
International Law of Intellectual Property and Trade, And Economic Development, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 271, 272 (2002) at n2. 
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tional fora.48 There are also accusations of “IP opportunism” that once again highlight the ten-
sions between developing countries and developed countries’ notions of IP protection.49
 
When we compare developed to developing countries, inevitably another type of comparison 
emerges in relation to the origin or context of creative works, in particular “industrial knowledge” 
as opposed to “traditional knowledge” (which predominate in the former and latter respectively). 
According to discussions we have had with CC jurisdiction teams in South America, the use of 
CC licenses is partly motivated by a desire to prevent the commercial appropriation of traditional 
knowledge for private interest. The Access to Knowledge movement and ally countries like Brazil 
and Argentina are proponents of copyright policies and regulations that take into account the 
special needs of developing countries.50 Also, we noted that in the case of China and possibly 
also in other countries some authors may be selecting CC licenses as a means of protecting 
some of their rights while at the same time avoiding the adoption of the “all rights reserved” doc-
trine, because the latter may be perceived as a tool for promoting and preserving a form of US 
cultural imperialism (consider the frequent references to Mickey Mouse in connection to the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 which led to similar extensions in other coun-
tries around the world).  
 
Contrast this to the predisposition of CC adopters in developed countries, where moving to a CC 
licensing model is a means of permitting more liberal sharing and use in a conscious (and per-
haps sometimes altruistic) decision to share more freely, rather than a means of preserving a lo-
cal culture and protecting it from appropriation (although the adoption of CC as an act of protest 
against the current copyright regime and its beneficiaries and a means of preserving a “free cul-
ture”, are factors in both developing and developed countries).  
Collective consciousness and a new identity 
Now let us take a more macro-level perspective of the use of CC licenses. From the fact that they 
are utilized and adopted across jurisdictions and from the sheer volume of usage a certain trend 
emerges from which we may draw the conclusion that from the borderless digital plane and the 
maturing of information technology, a new form of collective consciousness has developed. This 
is perhaps also partly driven by globalization. The global attitudes and practices towards file-
sharing (through Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology),51 the culture of re-use (remixing, mash-ups), 
                                                 
48 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellec-
tual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (2004). 
49 Lawrence A. Kogan, Brazil's IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private Property Rights, 38 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 1 (2006). Russia, China and India are also implicated in this article. See ibid. at 137. 
50 Kristin Delaney, World Wide Web: Using Internet Governance Structures to Address Intellectual Property 
and International Development, 32 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 603 (2007). Also writing on the face of Internet gov-
ernance and the WIPO development agenda. See also the Draft Access to Knowledge Treaty. WIPO, Draft 
Treaty on Access to Knowledge, 9 May 2005. available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/a2k.pdf and Indi-
care, Access to Knowledge: Make It Happen, available at: www.indicare.org/tiki-
read_article.php?articleId=102.  
51 The following are some factors that are likely to influence behavior towards digital file-sharing on P2P 
networks relating to copyrighted works: 
1. Flocking behavior (“Everyone else is doing it anyway”). 
2. Inter and intra reinforcing behavior (“Since I am already doing it; my friends are doing it and so shall 
I”; “My friends have given it to me, why should I buy it”). 
3. Self-interest, profit divorced from morality (“Why should I pay; it benefits the industry which is al-
ready rich anyway”). 
4. Us vs. Them mentality (the fight against the establishment). 
5. Hip factor (anti-authority underground movement). 
6. Generational gap affecting inculcation of values (i.e. the older generation is not familiar with digital 
behavior and thus cannot impart values or influence behavior), low valuation (i.e. values often im-
parted relate to personal morality relating to religion, culture and race, none of which have much to 
say about IP rights); high specificity in values (i.e. values often relate to general virtues such as 
honesty and integrity, but illustrated or in the social context, not relating to economic context). 
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pervasive and flagrant acts of piracy (emboldened by the perceived, though only partial, anonym-
ity of internet use) and the expectations of universal access and easy replication also support this 
conclusion. Modern creation has a greater regenerative tendency than ever before. Recycling 
and creative innovation through re-invention have become even more popular than ever. 
  
Another significant factor is the emergence of the user-creator (and user-created content, such as 
through Youtube, Flickr, Wikis and Blogs) which is largely premised on a ‘remix culture’. Skeptics 
of the CC movement refer to users of license wavers as “atypical authors” (i.e. the exception).52 
However, the irresistible fact is that the phenomenon of the user-creator (amateur or professional), 
who is not manufactured or nurtured for commercial success by industry and who is motivated by 
a complex mix of factors (going beyond mere profit) to create and share his/her creative works, 
has become a mainstay.53 The profile of user-creators is an interesting study as the demarcation 
between the user and the creator that usually drives the interest balancing mechanism is now 
erased to some extent. They have both the interest in control over their creativity but at the same 
time an interest in access to the creative works of others. This group of people is, to the best of 
our knowledge, a main adopter of the licenses.  
 
The new global consciousness is likely to be even more apparent in ‘Generation Z’, the genera-
tion that grows up with the Internet and that is familiar with the digital format of all types of works 
(unlike ‘Generation X and Y’ who have had to adapt to these new conditions). The one-sided con-
ception and psychology of creativity created by the existing copyright regime can be illustrated by 
the problems relating to the unsatisfactory treatment of TK and indigenous creativity under the 
copyright framework.54 The same argument could be made for the protectionist reaction to infor-
mation technology and its effects on the nature, replication/duplication and dissemination of crea-
tive works. As generation Z is nurtured in an environment of increased sharing and participation, 
we expect to see a gradual shift to a ‘user-creator’ age (whose early signs we are already wit-
nessing).  
 
We use Table 9 to compare the treatment of different types of creative works, which is also a 
comparison over time, although today all three types of works co-exist. It is precisely these differ-
ences that should be noted in evolving a holistic copyright framework that can at least acknowl-
edge, if not reconcile, their differences. 
 
So now that we have a compelling argument that there is an emerging global consciousness and 
a more liberal attitude towards the use of creative works as evidenced by the rapid adoption of 
CC licenses and other identified factors (particularly in relation to copying and distribution), the 
question is: How should this impact on the law and policy on copyright protection? Should people 
continue to be threatened with legal action for actions that they do not consider wrong and that 
they will continue to do as long as they are not likely to face adverse consequences?55 Also, is 
                                                                                                                                                 
7. New and emerging virtual community norms. 
See further, Archives.org at: http://www.archive.org/details/copyrightvscommunity. 
52 Mihaly Ficsor, The Wipo "Internet Treaties:" The United States as the Driver: The United States as the 
Main Source of Obstruction -- As seen by an Anti-Revolutionary Central European, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. 
Prop. L. 17, 35-37 (2006). Contra. Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope, and Longing for the Future of Author-
ship and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1171 
(2003), referring to the need for “cultural public domain” and the creative commons. 
53 See generally, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic 
Soul, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945 (2006). Note in particular the references to the “artistic soul” and the “ro-
mantic author”. Moral rights are particularly strong in European countries such as France. Ibid. At 1976, 
1977 & 1985.  
54 Simon. See also, Vandana Shiva, Protect or Plunder? (Zed Books, 2002). On what is “traditional knowl-
edge”, see WIPO, Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore, avail-
able at: http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/publications/genetic_resources.htm. 
55 “People do seem to buy into copyright norms, but they don't translate those norms into the rules that the 
copyright statute does; they find it very hard to believe that there's really a law out there that says the stuff 
the copyright law says…People don't obey laws that they don't believe in. It isn't necessarily that they be-
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there any way in which we can further encourage authors to license their works more liberally 
while also respecting the desires of those who do not wish to do so (if indeed we believe that in-
creased sharing and re-use will be beneficial for society as a whole)? 
 
Table 9: Comparison of treatment of creative works over time 
 
Period 
 
Subject of  
comparison 
 
TK Age 
Pre-Industrial Age 
 
IP Age 
Industrial Age and Early 
Information Age 
 
User-Creator Age 
Matured Information Age 
Human cognitive 
and social psy-
chology 
Collective con-
sciousness of peo-
ple from "simple" 
societies 
 
Individualistic knowledge 
and consciousness of 
people from "complex" 
societies 
Collective consciousness  re-
emerging from individualistic 
consciousness, singular global 
society56
Dominant behav-
ior 
Cooperative Competitive Cooperative (sharing) and com-
petitive 
Medium Word of mouth, 
familial and com-
munity forms of 
transfer 
Packaging, but moving 
towards technological 
format and transfer, also 
use of technology to con-
trol rights 
Technological intangible ‘product’ 
format and mode of delivery, less  
reliance on technological rights 
management 
Objective 
(theoretical justi-
fication) 
Largely Cultural 
 
“Fundamentally 
collective, coopera-
tive, informal, cu-
mulative, and often 
spiritual”57
Largely Commercial 
 
Corporatization and com-
mercial appropriation of 
culture, often disguised 
under the clothing of indi-
vidualism 
Mixed 
 
Empowerment of one (grater 
autonomy for the individual) and 
all (the community) 
Legal basis Commons 
 
 
 
From propertization (of 
tangible format) to rights 
creation (of intangible 
format) 
Mix of Commons58 and rights 
creation (through licenses) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have lawlessly, or that they'll steal whatever they can if they think they can get away with it. Most people try 
to comply, at least substantially, with what they believe the law to say. If they don't believe the law says what 
it in fact says, though, they won't obey it - not because they are protesting its provisions, but because it 
doesn't stick in their heads.” Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to 
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 237, 238-239 (1997), available at: http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~jdlitman/papers/no.htm. See also, Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperial-
istic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 613, 616 (1996) ("Intellectual property is noth-
ing more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it for it to 
be effective."). See also, Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235 (1991) (examining the 
difference between the prevailing public myth of copyright and existing copyright statute and case law). 
56 Compare this to the challenges to state sovereignty and control in the age of globalization and the “com-
munication revolution”. See Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information 
Age, 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1 (2004). 
57 Simon at 1618. 
58 E.g., the “free culture movement”. See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology 
and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (Penguin Press, 2004); James Boyle, The Second 
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); 
James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2003); Anupam Chander, 
The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715, 797 (2003); and Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common 
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 364-86 
(1999). For a more moderated and measured response to issue, see Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, 
The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1331 (2004), arguing that the commons “is not always 
kind to the commoners”, and suggesting solutions particularly in the relation to TK. See also, R. Polk Wag-
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Period 
 
Subject of  
comparison 
 
TK Age 
Pre-Industrial Age 
 
IP Age 
Industrial Age and Early 
Information Age 
 
User-Creator Age 
Matured Information Age 
Relationship Community (in-
digenous) 
Corporate model (exclu-
sive and nurtured crea-
tors, capitalist concep-
tions) 
Emergence of independent user-
creator, deconstruction of the 
vertically integrated corporate 
model 
Most suitable 
legal framework 
for comparison 
(and use?) 
N/A Private international law 
and domestic frameworks 
Public international law modified 
to encompass personality of indi-
viduals – use of concepts like 
customary law to decipher ap-
propriate form of behavior? 
General applica-
tion (scope) 
More in developing 
countries and tradi-
tional societies 
More in developed coun-
tries and industrialized 
nations 
Everyone in any country with 
internet access 
Current le-
gal/policy status 
Seeking sui generic 
treatment 
Supported by existing 
framework 
May influence existing framework 
Description of 
subject matter 
Amorphous subject 
matter, owned by 
collectivity or com-
munity 
Largely privately owned, 
sometimes privately cre-
ated and ‘manufactured’ 
Both TK and IP types of works 
but with more amateur- and 
peer-produced content 
 
When millions of people exchange music files over the Internet, statutes can criminalize it and 
judges can rule that such acts infringe copyright and even force online services and technologies 
facilitating file sharing to shut down. What they cannot do, however, is reach into their psyche to 
make these people accept these laws as a matter of collective conscience.59 “There is a growing 
disjuncture between the Copyright Act, copyright case law and the ways individuals (in their con-
sumptive capacities) have traditionally used, and would prefer to continue to use, copyrighted 
content.”60 The argument becomes even stronger when we introduce the new user-creator into 
the equation. Moreover, it is also counter-productive to sue users (in particular, in relation to mu-
sic)61 as is the strategic/tactical trend in the U.S. and Europe.62 It will only serve to alienate and 
stigmatize them unnecessarily (due to the divide between law and morality and the ambiguities of 
morality in such acts). Also, user rights should be unambiguous and consistent in all jurisdictions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 
995 (2003), where the writer argues in defense of the control conferred by IP rights.  
59 See also, Mark Landler, U.S. Is Only the Tip of Pirated Music Iceberg (The New York Times, 26 Septem-
ber 2003), available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/technology/26MUSI.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5007&en=f5d01f3518536
9c8&ex=1379908800&partner=USERLAND, where the journalist noted that “[t]he industry's biggest hurdle 
may be cultural”, with file swapping and CD burning “viewed in most countries as routine, not renegade, 
behaviour.” 
60 Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 13, 
15-16 (2003). See also, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 21 (2004), arguing for enhanced user rights; and Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Property and Public 
Values: The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347 (2005). 
61 See the latest statistics on the music market at the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI) website at: http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_statistics/index.html. 
62 Amanda M. Witt, Burned in the USA: Should The Music Industry Utilize its American Strategy of Suing 
Users to Combat Online Piracy in Europe?, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 375, 381-384 (U.S.) & 397-402 (Europe) 
(2005). Alluding to file sharing as a “form of digital civil disobedience”. Ibid. at 400. 
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There is granted no “global village” or “global (virtual) community” in all senses of the word,63 
which is also evident in the different licensing patterns in our dataset, but there is a growing 
global consciousness specifically relating to the creation, storage, dissemination and treatment of 
digital information; and when previous forms of creative works take on the form and characteris-
tics of digital information, then they become treated in the same manner. If copyright laws have 
created some exceptions for written information to allow the Internet to work, then so should they 
create protection for other (no less important) forms of IT that add to the functionality and benefits 
of the Internet. Hence, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court treatment of Peer-to-Peer technol-
ogy in the line of cases leading to (but probably not culminating in) MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd. 545 U.S. 913 (2005), and the balancing objective behind the creation of, and modifications to, 
the “substantial non-infringement” test.  
 
The emergence of the collective consciousness and the convergence of values, at least in rela-
tion to copyright, should thus be taken into consideration with a view to policy and law-making in 
the copyright regime to render it one that is realistic and that takes into greater account the inter-
ests of all the parties (not just that of the traditional copyright holders), including the user-creators. 
This leads directly to next part of this paper on the law and policy implications of this study. 
Law and policy implications 
Why and how is this empirical study useful for policy and law-making beyond offering statistical 
and anecdotal evidence of CC licensing behavior? CC licenses play an important role as identifi-
cation of trend and detection of the growth or as evidence of the existence of ‘new users’ and a 
new mindset regarding IP, in order to convince and influence legislative and policy changes. We 
believe that tracking the expectations and attitudes of the user, and in particular the user-creator, 
is important and should be seriously considered when decisions are made as to the appropriate 
scope and nature of copyright protection, whether defined under law or influenced through policy 
actions. The interpretation of data will provide some clue on this. It is often the case that the 
voices of the users are not heard above the strong lobbying efforts made by ‘copyright industries’ 
with their own interests and agenda to protect.  
 
Law and policy changes may first take place locally but will eventually have to be effected at the 
international level to be consistent with the arguments of universality wrought by cyberspace and 
to produce the fairest result and a penetrative and consistent effect among different jurisdictions. 
It should be kept in mind that the more radical the change the less likely that it will be accepted 
for adoption or successfully implemented. Hence, various options, in order of degree of change, 
will be suggested. These suggestions are not exhaustive and it is hoped that the findings in this 
study and the opinions put forth will form the catalyst to generate more discussions and ideas on 
how to resolve the issue and to improve copyright law to reflect modern technological realities. 
 
Under the Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention of 1967, a clause was created that imposes con-
straints on the possible limitations to the protected exclusive rights under domestic copyright laws 
of signatory states. It has since acquired the moniker of the “Berne three-step test” and has been 
included in several international treaties on copyright since it first appeared (e.g. the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty, the EU Copyright Directive and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty). It 
was also adopted in modified form in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, where it reads as fol-
lows:  
 
                                                 
63 Kate Gardens, The Global Community Myth (Yours Daily, 25 February 2007), available at: 
http://www.yoursdaily.com/culture_media/media/the_global_community_myth. Jonathan H. Blavin and I. 
Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 
16 Harv. J. Law & Tec 265, 272 (2002). Metaphors can restrict thought, but it can also put matters into con-
text and help one understand things better. 
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“Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain spe-
cial cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.” 
 
The test may become a constraint to the reduction of copyright law unless the WTO decides that 
the changes comply with the test (e.g. it was invoked as a justification for refusing some excep-
tions to copyright that members of the French parliament wanted to include during the examina-
tion of the controversial DADVSI copyright bill). This is a hurdle that has to be overcome, perhaps 
by interpretation but preferably by amendment to the test itself, in order to fulfill some or all of the 
below proposed amendments. 
 
“Fair use” or “fair dealing” (depending on the jurisdiction) is the main exception to copyright pro-
tection and it can be general (and remain guided by statutory factors and/or judge-made analyses 
of what is “fair”) or purpose-specific. Some of the main factors include, for example, those listed 
under 17 U.S.C. 107, such as the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the work, the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the work as a whole and the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The ease and universality 
of access and copying is effectively broadening common perceptions of what constitutes fair use. 
Also, there are other factors such as societal/public benefits from sharing and re-use that are not 
specifically stated although they remain relevant since the factors we listed earlier are non-
exhaustive. Even then, they should be enunciated at the very least, if not considered with a view 
to a change of the fundamental scope of copyright protection, to accommodate modern notions of 
fairness between copyright holders and users. 
i. Distinctive Behavior and Attitude Towards Different Works: The Case for Estab-
lishing Specific Copyright Regimes 
There should be specific copyright regimes for different media types.64 One side does not fit all.65 
Different formats and subject matter require specific regimes and a fine tuning of their systems of 
protection to achieve greater fairness in the balancing of interests between relevant parties.  
 
We have seen how TK requires a different type of protection from the existing IP regime (based 
upon subject matter).66 So too should copyright in the digital age, more in relation to how formats 
and devices have changed and how attitudes and behavior have developed towards them (since 
the substantive content is largely the same as before, and largely informational in nature). We 
have already seen this naturally evolve in the example of the ‘software commons’. With these 
specific carve-outs, the IP regime becomes more versatile, responsive and realistic. 
Case Illustration for Musical Works 
A moderate option to the radical alternative of overhauling the entire copyright system will be to 
create a different regime for the type of work to which the digital format has created a compelling 
argument for change. Musical works, for instance, have become very different from the days 
when they were tied to a tangible form.67 The audio experience and expectations of users have 
been fundamentally changed by a conglomeration of factors: 
                                                 
64 Original works include literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. There may be more than one copy-
right in a work. 
65 Doris Estelle Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural Inclusion, 10 Cardozo 
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 217 (2002). The writer examines the “disintegratory trends of regionalism and indigeniza-
tion which have developed in response to the integratory processes of globalization [and IPR harmoniza-
tion]”, and argues for the democratization of the harmonization process in the globalization trend.  
66 Chander and Sunder 1354-1372 (examining the attempts at “reorder[ing] the exploitation of the com-
mons”). 
67 See Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 907 (2005); Deborah Tussey, 
Music at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Systems Perspective on File Sharing, 37 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 147 
(2005); and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural 
Context, 84 N.C.L. Rev. 547 (2006). See also, Yu (Copyright Divide) at 374-401, 401-437. 
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1. The emergence of many different formats and advances in audio compression technology  
(MP3, MP4, etc.) 
2. Time/Space/Format-shifting, ease of transfer (P2P), duplication and cross-transposition 
through mediums and devices (storage and playing) 
3. Versatility in the use of samples, hooks, etc. – by its nature music ends itself to adaptations 
and re-use, and this effect is even more pronounced in modern hip hop and electronic music. 
4. Music is also unique in that the pleasure derived from its use and re-use does not diminish or 
diminishes very little despite the number of times it is used or re-used (this pleasure can in 
fact increase or be revived through adaptation/remixing) 
5. Same or similar music can even enhance interest symbiotically (e.g. original versions, sam-
pled songs, remixes, etc.) thus contributing to reputation and profit 
6. Music is the medium that is transacted most frequently in file sharing networks, and in this 
sense there is an established practice among users of sharing music files freely 
 
In contrast, other works are different. For example, written works are more one-dimensional, they 
are still preferred in tangible form, often allow for single use before steep diminishing returns and 
it is still a strong social taboo to plagiarize. There is hence greater support for protection of au-
thor’s rights, both commercial and moral. Video/movies are also more single-use in nature before 
seeing a steep drop in returns and sampling can only make sense in the form of short clips, modi-
fied or otherwise, used for reporting, criticisms and review and commentary, parody, satire, etc. 
Hence the profitability of the ‘first cut’ is very important commercially for these forms of works.  
ii. Adjustments to the Scope of Copyright Protection in the Digital Context 
Copyright law is not set in stone. We already see it undergoing constant amendments in both the 
international and domestic context. The current regime can be fine-tuned in a continuing effort to 
achieve as fair a balance as possible between all interest parties to creative works. 
 
Currently, the exclusive rights over an original work that is reserved to the copyright holder in-
clude the right to reproduce, publish, perform, communicate and adapt the work for a specific pe-
riod of time.68 The right can be assigned at the owner’s prerogative in whole or in part and the 
presumption in the past has been that it will mostly be done for profit. 
 
Adoption of a CC license alone relinquishes the copyright holder’s monopoly over the reproduc-
tion and distribution of the work concerned. The exercise of showing the popularity of CC licenses 
evidences the fact that there is a significant number of creators that do not want or need to re-
serve ownership or all rights over their work in order to maximize commercial value, whatever 
their motivations may be. The fact that the Non-Commercial (NC) constraint still applies to many 
CC licenses, however, does show that the element of fairness and a certain degree of profit inter-
est remains. This proposition is further supported by the creation and use of the Share-Alike (SA) 
function. The advent of the user-creator and the rise of a collective consciousness are other com-
pelling factors that support reducing the scope of protection.  
 
                                                 
68 Generally, under IPR, copyright law consists of five basic protected exclusive rights the violation of which 
constitutes copyright infringement (see e.g. 17 U.S.C. 106). They are the right to: 
• Reproduce the work in copies;  
• Prepare derivative works based upon the work;  
• Distribute copies of the work to the public (e.g. by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, 
or lending);  
• Publicly perform the work (in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works);  
• Publicly display the work (in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, still images and other audiovisual work).  
Certain works consist of multiple copyrights (e.g. musical works can contain copyrightable content in their 
composition, recording and lyrics, where applicable). 
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The next question then is: How should the scope of protection be reduced (method) and to what 
extent (degree)? The following are some suggestions on the approach to the issue (in diminishing 
order of ‘radicalism’). They are offered in the alternative or may be adopted cumulatively (if com-
plementary): 
a. When, How and to Whom Protection is Extended 
This approach challenges the notion that the optimal/ideal default should be automatic protection 
with an ‘opt-out’ approach. For instance, we can redefine the nature and scope of copyright pro-
tection such as by offering protection (or extended protection in time) only by registration (the 
‘opt-in’ approach that already exists for trademark and patent protection).  
 
Perhaps there should also be more pre-requisites for opting in such as making it a precondition to 
show or prove originality and tangible expression (including in digital form) or to explain the rea-
son for requiring protection (e.g. commercial exploitation, to protect moral rights, etc.). The more 
onerous the requirements, the more difficult it would be to register. The effect is that works are 
freely available for society’s benefit (across jurisdictions), unless otherwise reserved. This also 
removes the deterrent effect that a default protection may have on use and re-use (reticence due 
to uncertainty). 
b. Commerciality as an Element of Protection or Infringement 
Since the foundation of modern IPR (including copyright laws and policy) is the protection of com-
mercial value, ostensibly to promote creativity,69 if it is shown that that connection is not as strong 
as before (or as it was assumed), the commerciality element may be the key for change.  
 
Even in the use of CC licenses, commerciality is a prominent feature in the release of works for 
copying and distribution. This already gives a strong incentive for commerciality to be made a 
factor for protection or to establish infringement. This can be done, perhaps, by redefining the 
limits of protection such as through the expansion of non-commercial infringement exemptions 
(e.g. experimental exemption) beyond featuring it as just a factor (albeit an important one) in de-
termining the fair use exception (provided that the domestic exception is in fact a broad one 
rather than a purpose-specific one).70  
 
An alternative approach will be to redefine infringement to remove non-commercial uses. For in-
stance, the doctrine of profit-making purpose can be used to exempt end-users from criminal 
and/or civil liabilities (where applicable),71 or to distinguish between liabilities (i.e. different de-
grees of infringement with commercial infringement being of higher culpability). Currently, there 
are primary and secondary liability for infringement, defined as exercising the rights or encourag-
ing/facilitating/authorizing/etc. (as the case may be) any of the rights that are exclusive to the 
copyright holder (see, e.g. 7 U.S.C. 501; section 31 Singapore Copyright Act). It should be noted 
that there are also in existence other forms of infringement, in the context of the physical world, 
which feature commerciality as an element of the offence (but not solely, see 7 U.S.C. 501; sec-
tions 32-33 of the Singapore Copyright Act on “distribution” and “prejudice”). The approach will 
                                                 
69 The main motivation for the recent extension of copyright protection through time and space is monetary 
benefits. 
70 In some jurisdictions fair use is defined with respect to particular purposes, e.g., academic/educational, 
etc. 
71 See Wei Yanliang and Feng Xiaoqing, Comments on Cyber Copyright Disputes in the People’s Republic 
of China: Maintaining the Status Quo While Expanding the Doctrine of Profit-Making Purposes, 7 Marq. Intell. 
Prop. L. Rev. 149, 150-151 and 185-198 (2003), available at: http://law.marquette.edu/ip/Yanliang.pdf. The 
doctrine was noted to have been accepted in the 1997 Criminal Code of China although civil rules could still 
provide a platform for legal action against such individuals. The authors advocated the expansion of the doc-
trine to Internet transactions. They argue from the perspective of protecting Chinese interests in the light of 
foreign pressures to conform to their notions and versions of copyright protection. 
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depend on how significant the loss of commercial advantage is as compared to the importance of 
permitting as extensive a use or benefit of a work to society as possible.72
 
In any event, the approach taken on the consequences and enforcement of infringement should 
also be revisited. The increase in civil liability and the introduction of criminal penalties serve to 
stigmatize and deter acts (e.g. 17 U.S.C. 506), some of which the actors do not consider morally 
wrong. The offence and punishment should reflect and be proportionate to the ‘wrongness’ of the 
act as defined by societal norms. 
c. Clearly Defining User Freedoms 
In the context of the Internet we already see concessions and adaptations made to the digital era 
under copyright law, particularly in relation to the release of personal copying and distribution 
rights. There are provisions made on duplication of digital works, in particular information, such as 
over the Internet in updated copyright laws of many countries in order to reconcile copyright pro-
tection with modern forms of electronic interaction. Hence, copying as a function of the Internet is 
customarily, and legally where statutorily provided, not considered an infringement. In fact, it may 
also be argued that placing something on the Web without any qualifications or measures of pro-
tection implies a general relinquishment of exclusive rights to copying and distribution (perhaps 
within reasonable limits, such as copying or distribution that are in the same nature as the original 
source, similar to the share-alike principle and Copyleft licenses (e.g. non-commercial, if the 
source rendered it for free). 
 
There should be international harmonization and statutory enactment of clear user exceptions in 
other cases, particularly dealing with paid products/services, whether digital or otherwise, in such 
a manner that the transfer of a creative work should be done with the same rights whatever the 
‘packaging’ or lack thereof (i.e. whether in tangible form or digital). They include: 
 
1. Clarifying user freedom to time- and format/space-shift (such as recording a television pro-
gram to watch at another time, to rip music from a Compact Disc to a computer digital player 
and to transfer songs between devices). 
2. Removing the confusing distinctions between licenses of such works, such as disparate End-
User License Agreements (EULAs), perhaps through the regulation and standardization of li-
censes to reduce proliferation of license permutations/variations for use of digital songs which 
are subject to varying degrees and types of, and sometimes unreasonable, restrictions and 
that are also different from the rights attached to music sold in tangible form such as on 
Compact Discs, including the first sale doctrine (or exhaustion of rights), back-up copying, 
personal use copying, etc. 
3. Specifying freedoms for user-creators re-using for non-commercial purposes (which intro-
duces an automatic share-alike function as the same freedoms will apply to similar subse-
quent re-uses). 
d. Expanding Cultural Freedom 
The results in this paper show that authors are generally keen to allow for the creation of deriva-
tive works, except for some cases where authors are very protective of their content. We have 
argued that this form of user-motivated protectionism, when it does occur, surprisingly more so 
for non-commercial derivatives, is irrational, as non-commercial derivation has only indirect and 
marginal, if any, negative consequences on the author’s utility.73  
 
As the act of derivation is central to the Internet age and digital media culture, non-commercial 
derivatives should be considered for carving out from protection as the current reliance on fair 
                                                 
72 This is because the loss of profit may not be tied to commercial use by others, hence free distribution and 
sharing can and do affect commerciality of a product. So the change to be considered will depend on whose 
interest is more important. 
73 Moral rights-related concerns, i.e. an author’s desire to protect the work from misuse, may be a factor why 
some authors choose to forbid derivation. 
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use or dealing and specific factor analysis or purpose-specific exemptions may not be sufficient. 
The suggestions for freedom to adapt can include the following (in decreasing order of severity): 
 
1. Completely remove adaptation from protection. 
2. Expand exemptions for adaptations. For example, (a) regarding the use of samples in accor-
dance with acceptable sampling practices; or (b) by exempting non-commercial adaptations 
for creative re-use such as art, commentary, parody and satire; or (c) by applying the exemp-
tion narrowly for specific works, such as for musical works or film clips (although non-
substantial use of either can still constitute fair use and is thus not considered infringement). 
iii. License Development: Usefulness for CC License Evaluation 
Statistics are useful for CC license creation or adaptation as they form a basis for the improve-
ment of existing license permutations and also for the introduction of new forms of licenses 
(which have to be weighed against the disadvantages of license proliferation). The different ver-
sions of CC licenses available today are the direct outcome of improvements sought after the 
study of license usage and selection. For example, attribution is not even made an option any 
more, as it was determined that the number of people not selecting it is insignificant. It is hoped 
that this study will contribute to the data that will help CC license creators of generic and country-
specific licenses in the drafting of future licenses, both in relation to type and version. 
 
One interesting facet of license choice that our analysis has revealed pertains to the authors’ 
choice of No-Derivatives (ND) licenses. We notice that by-nc-nd is much more popular than by-nd, 
even if it is the case that allowing non-commercial derivatives introduces much less of a disad-
vantage (if any) to the author. It is conceivable that some of the authors who select by-nc-nd 
would prefer a license permitting commercial copying and distribution but forbidding commercial 
derivation. These would be authors who expect royalty fees for use in derivative works to be their 
main source of compensation for the work. They would have an incentive to let third parties pro-
mote the work, even commercially, so that the work spreads as much as possible, with the expec-
tation of getting compensated in the future by licensing the work for use in advertising and other 
profit-oriented activities.  
 
Similarly (although perhaps less likely), some authors may want to maintain exclusive rights to 
commercial copying and distribution, while allowing for commercial derivatives. These authors 
would presumably be motivated by a desire or expectation to profit from the distribution of their 
work and an additional wish to promote creative re-use in all its forms. Allowing third parties to 
freely create commercial derivatives of one’s work can in theory be very beneficial for the original 
author as it increases third party incentives to improve upon the work and promote the derivative 
product, so that the author’s sales of the original work may also benefit from the success of the 
derivatives. Imposing the NC constraint on derivatives will likely discourage many from attempting 
to re-use the work with the expectation of an uncertain commercial gain. Large music labels and 
movie studios will be able to take that risk, but peer producers with limited funds will be less moti-
vated to do so.  
 
The way the licenses are currently structured, the NC clause applies both to copying/distribution 
and to derivation. Partially decoupling the two, so that an author may choose an NC constraint for 
either or both would provide much more flexibility for the users of CC licenses and only introduce 
two additional licenses: one permitting non-commercial distribution only but both commercial and 
non-commercial derivation and one permitting commercial and non-commercial distribution but 
only non-commercial derivatives74. We would in any case recommend conducting a user survey 
to collect feedback from the community before introducing such changes. It is up to the commu-
nity to evaluate whether the introduction of one or two new license types is justified effort for the 
                                                 
74 Some amendments may be required in the NC clause of CC-licenses to make it consistent with this new, 
more flexible licensing 
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benefit of decoupling commerciality constraints on sharing/distribution and derivatives. Adding 
new license types might also require renaming the rest of the licenses in the CC framework. 
 
Even without the introduction of these new licenses, we believe that renaming the currently sup-
ported license types can improve clarity (although one argument against doing so would be that 
authors are already used to the current nomenclature and introducing a new notation may cause 
some confusion). CC licenses are meant to be used not only by the professional but also by the 
ordinary person who should be able to make a sound licensing decision without legal advice. This 
is why ‘deeds’, simplified descriptions of the licenses, have been introduced for each license type 
and each license has been named in way that is meant to be self-descriptive. Unfortunately the 
current names of the licenses do not convey as much information as they could.  
 
For example, the most liberal license is named ‘by’, because it contains only one constraint: ‘by 
attribution’. But arguably far more important than this one constraint are the freedoms that this 
license makes possible, and these are not reflected in the current naming scheme. Similar argu-
ments can be constructed for the other licenses. In our study of CC license usage so far we have 
encountered a few cases of misinterpretation of the licenses by users, so having meaningful 
names for the licenses is of great importance and also a matter of responsibility towards the us-
ers of CC who should be fully aware of the freedoms and constraints associated with each li-
cense type before they elect to use it for their work. 
Implications for free culture movement 
The global spread of CC licenses, across jurisdictions with very different sociopolitical makeup 
and economic backgrounds, is encouraging evidence for the global appeal of the promotion and 
protection of a ‘free culture’. Nevertheless, to dispel some myths on the motivations behind CC 
licensing, we have discussed how the motives of CC adopters may not always be altruis-
tic/ideological after all, and sometimes may not be consistent with the ideals of ‘free culture’. It 
appears that many authors are still driven, at least partially, by profit or by expectations of future 
rewards, whereas in countries with very lax enforcement of copyright law some authors may be 
using the licenses as a means of asserting more control over their works rather than relinquishing 
some of it. These motivations should be recognized and accepted as factors which likely influ-
ence (we do not know exactly to what extent) the mindset of CC adopters.  
 
A large share of CC’s broad appeal is probably due to the very fact that CC provides tools and 
options to a set of authors who are very diverse not only in their use of different media types, but 
also in their attitudes and values in relation to their creations, instead of having a prescribed set of 
rules determining what is or is not an appropriate approach to the treatment of their works. How-
ever, CC licenses do appear to have strong supporters within more critical (and sometimes more 
radicalized) parts of the global information society which tend to be more outspoken opponents of 
the current copyright regime or even of notions of intellectual property in general, either because 
of their ideological conviction, such as a firm belief that information and cultural production should 
be free for all, or because they live in developing regions of the world where economic limitations 
naturally lead to a higher reliance on communal/peer-based forms of production. This avant-
garde of volunteers, activists and outspoken copyright critics perpetrating the notion of a ‘social 
commons’, as Ronaldo Lemos puts it,75 is critical to the promotion and success of CC, as their 
support for CC is strongly intrinsically motivated and to the best of our knowledge they are usually 
among the early and most enthusiastic adopters in any jurisdiction. 
 
CC will therefore have to continue on a path of striking a balance between offering tools and op-
tions for a broad population of authors and catering to the sensitivities of some of its most pas-
sionate supporters who may be more radical in their thinking and approach than many of the au-
thors adopting the licenses. Failing to maintain this balance will result in either the gradual mar-
                                                 
75 In Ronaldo Lemos, From Legal Commons to Social Commons: Brazil and the Cultural Industry in the 21st 
Century, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford (Working Paper). 
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ginalization through radicalization of the movement or, on the other extreme, the loss of a signifi-
cant part of the movement’s core supporters. This is because CC may be politically moderate or 
even somewhat ‘apolitical’ at its core (Lawrence Lessig sometimes refers to the Creative Com-
mons as “a set of tools”), but is supported by and dependent on a much broader social and politi-
cal movement which in many ways is a movement for social change. The CC agenda can play an 
important role in reconciling the more extreme positions currently taken by proponents and oppo-
nents of the existing copyright framework (e.g. the industry lobbyists and the Free Software 
movement respectively), and thus offer realistic solutions such as the voluntary use of its licenses 
(in the short term) and perhaps as the catalyst for copyright law and policy reform (in the longer 
term). 
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